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Imagine being a wheat farmer, working against unpredictable forces to produce 
grain for the commercial market. You wonder if the weather will co-operate to provide 
you with good planting, growing and harvesting conditions, and enable you to pay 
enough to the bank to ensure that it will not foreclose on your account and force you to 
lose everything. You take your grain to the elevator, located many miles away, to accept 
whatever price the grain company will pay you. Or imagine being a hog farmer, dealing 
with similarly harsh conditions, unsure as to whether your herd may be wiped out by 
disease and fearful the domestic or international market may turn against your product.
As you send your hogs to market, you, and thousands of farmers like you, are forced to 
accept the price offered by the few meat-packing companies that dominate the market. 
These are the very problems Canadian farmers faced throughout much of their history. 
What options did farmers have? Urban workers could unionize and negotiate with 
management, but with what management were farmers to negotiate? And how would 
you bring all the farmers together around one goal, if they, unlike factory workers, did 
not congregate daily in one place? Canadian farmers experimented with several different 
methods o f dealing with these problems, from becoming actively involved in politics to 
establishing voluntary co-operatives and finally, through lobbying the federal and 
provincial governments to create compulsory marketing boards, akin to workers unions. 
Some of these attempts were successful, while others resulted in failure and 
disappointment for farmers.
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Between 1960 and 1965, thousands of Ontario farmers invested money in the 
Farmers’ Allied Meat Enterprises, with some farmers staking their entire life savings on 
the project. Farmers’ Allied Meat Enterprises, or FAME as those in Ontario came to 
know it, was an attempt by hog farmers to build a co-operative meat packing plant in 
Ontario. These adventurous and industrious farmers hoped to break into the meat 
packing industry, viewed as a sure-fire way to make a profit. In so doing, the farmers 
hoped to increase the price corporate meat packers paid for the hogs produced by Ontario 
farmers. The establishment o f FAME was one more attempt by Canadian farmers to 
improve their position in society, a position which they felt had been weakening since the 
late nineteenth century, when the Canadian economy began to move towards a more 
commercial and industrial focus. As the relative size of the farm population and the 
importance of agriculture in Canada began to decline, farmers turned to various methods 
o f organization in order to maintain or improve their position in a changing society.
The earliest agricultural organizations defending the rights o f farmers originated 
in the United States and entered Ontario in the 1870s. In the 1880s, home-grown 
agricultural organizations interested in reducing tariffs which were seen as harmful to 
Canadian agriculture developed on the Prairies.1 Over the next century, Canadian 
agricultural organizations took a number of forms, including social groups, political 
parties, commercial co-operatives and marketing organizations. While most farmers’ 
groups focused on affecting government policy, others strictly forbade any sort of 
political activity. Some farm organizations believed direct political pressure was 
necessary and tried to elect representatives, with the high point of this direct political
1 Vernon C. Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy, The Historical Pattern (Toronto: University o f Toronto 
Press, 1946), 259-262.
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activity occurring in the early 1920s. The first half of the 1920s saw the rise o f farmer 
groups across the country: a Farmer-Labour government was elected in Ontario in 1919 
and The United Farmers o f Alberta in 1921 was elected in Alberta. The National 
Progressive Party achieved success on the federal scene in the 1921 general election.
Farm organizations experimented with various commercial enterprises as well. The early 
Order of the Patrons of Husbandry, or the Grange, focused on direct purchasing in bulk 
from manufacturers which lowered the prices farmers paid for their goods. Numerous 
farm organizations attempted to form co-operatives or similar companies. However, 
most of these commercial endeavours failed, with notable exceptions being the United 
Grain Growers Limited and the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company.
Another major focus for farmers’ organizations centred on attempts by farmers to 
increase the price of their products by controlling the marketing o f their products. Once 
again, this took many forms. Voluntary marketing co-operatives were organized by fruit 
growers as early as 1913 in the Okanagan Valley, British Columbia.2 The three prairie 
wheat pools formed by 1924, sold their wheat through the Canadian Co-operative Wheat 
Pools Limited. Membership in the pools was based on voluntary involvement and the 
membership drives met with great success. While pool members opposed the idea of
• 3mandatory involvement in the pool, pressure to create a compulsory pool remained.
The financial failure o f the wheat pools and their subsequent take-over by the 
federal government in the early 1930s was clear evidence for many that such
2 W.M. Drummond, ‘The Role of Agricultural Marketing Boards’, 246 in The Canadian Economy: 
Selected Readings, eds John J. Deutsch, Burton S. Keirstead, Kari Levitt and Robert M. Will (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1965), 246-256.
3 Garry Lawrence Fairbaim, From Prairie Roots: The Remarkable Story o f  Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
(Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1984), 42. At various times, through 1927-1929, members of 
the wheat pool rejected the idea of compulsory pooling, 77.
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organizations could only be successful if involvement was compulsory. If membership 
was allowed on a voluntary nature, farmers could sell outside o f the pool or marketing 
organization if  better prices were offered elsewhere, which would in turn eliminate the 
possible bargaining advantages created by pooling products. In 1935, the Bennett 
government created the Canadian Wheat Board as a replacement for the Wheat Pools. On 
27 September 1943, Ottawa ordered an end to the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, thus giving 
the Wheat Board a monopoly of grain sales.4 These developments significantly changed 
the methods through which farm organizations could operate. Other federal legislation 
showed that this protection was not just available for wheat farmers. The Natural 
Products Marketing Act, passed by Parliament in 1934, allowed the development of 
marketing schemes for specific agricultural products, if  the main market of these products 
was outside the province of their production.5 The federal government was careful to 
limit the authority of this act so it did not impose on provincial control over natural 
resources. After the passage of this act, producers of various agricultural commodities 
across the country created marketing boards for their products. When the Supreme Court 
of Canada declared the Natural Products Marketing Act ultra vires in 1936, or beyond 
the authority o f the Federal Parliament, provincial governments enacted their own 
marketing legislation to save the marketing schemes farmers had created. In Ontario, this 
took the form of the Ontario Farm Products Control Act, passed in 1937, later amended 
and renamed the Farm Products Marketing Act in 1946. This legislation allowed the 
creation o f monopolistic marketing organizations controlled by producers, intended to 
counteract the monopolistic practices o f food processors and retailing organizations that
4 Ibid., 151.
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many farmers viewed as a far too common occurrence in the supposed “free-market”. To 
opponents of the act, the Farm Products Marketing Act “represented a major retreat from 
the principles of free-market economics.”6
Ontario hog producers first began to organize under the Farm Products Marketing 
Act in 1941. The Ontario Hog Producers Association (OHPA) organized in order to 
maintain the rights and economic position of hog producers during the war.7 The 
organization o f the OHPA led to the development of the Ontario Hog Producers 
Marketing Board (OHPMB), the Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative (OHPC), and the 
Farmers’ Allied Meat Enterprises (FAME). These projects were all part of an ambitious 
plan for hog farmers to control where their products were sold, be it in open-yards or 
directly to processors, and to achieve some control over the market and the prices they 
received for their goods. The OHPMB was the first example o f ‘single desk selling’ of 
livestock in Ontario, or one organization controlling and co-ordinating the sale of a 
particular type o f good. The OHPMB was thus the first example in Ontario of commodity 
producers working together to set the price of their goods.
As the first of its type, the development of the OHPMB reflected the many 
problems inherent in organizing that type of marketing board, as it moved from being a 
voluntary to a compulsory organization.8 The individuals who organized the OHPMB 
faced considerable resistance from the government. For example, in October 1955 
Ontario’s Conservative Premier, Leslie Frost, asked the Supreme Court of Ontario to rule
5 T.G. Norris, W.C. Hopper and R.A. Mack, ‘The Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934,’ The Canadian 
Journal o f  Economics and Political Science 1, no. 3 (August 1935): 466.
6 K.J. Rea, The Prosperous Years: The Economic History o f  Ontario, 1939-1975 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1985), 139.
7 Wilfred L. Bishop, Men and Pork Chops: A History o f  the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board 
(London, ON: Phelps Publishing Co, 1977), 3.
8 Rea, The Prosperous Years, 140.
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on the validity of the Farm Products Control Act, with the court eventually ruling the act 
valid.9 The fact that the OHPMB organized livestock producers presented problems of its 
own. While grain growers could potentially pool their crop and hold it from market, 
livestock producers would have to sell their animals when they were ready for market or 
risk seeing the quality o f the animals deteriorate. The OHPMB also met with 
considerable opposition from the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Board, the private 
packing companies, and groups of dissident hog producers.10 It was due to the hard work 
of devoted individuals that the hog producers persevered and were successful. The 
establishment o f the OHPMB enabled producers of other commodities to create their own 
marketing boards. The establishment of the single-desk changed farm organizations 
forever because the marketing legislation seriously affected attempts to create co­
operatives. Co-operatives were significantly weakened, as members could no longer 
ensure their livestock would arrive at the co-operative owned packing plant, and the 
supply of products to the plants became threatened, as displayed by the eventual failure 
of FAME and other meat-packing plants, including the First Co-operative Packers of 
Barrie, or COPACO.
By the 1960s, it was clear co-operatives were not successful in their attempts to 
affect farm prices because of their voluntary nature.11 Compulsory marketing schemes 
became the primary hope for farmers in the battle to improve their situation in society. 
Marketing boards differed significantly from previous attempts at agricultural 
organization because the boards focused strictly on economics, controlling market 
supply, and did not attempt to influence political parties. The marketing boards were not
9 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 91.
10 Rea, The Prosperous Years, 140.
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political bodies, like the Grange, but nor were they voluntary organizations. Instead, 
marketing boards relied on the provincial governments to enforce compulsory 
participation. Farm leaders realized the non-agrarian population demographically 
outnumbered them. Since they could not rely on the political good-will o f the entire 
Canadian population, or the voluntary involvement of the farm population, farm leaders 
believed compulsory involvement was necessary in order to maintain their position in 
society and the economy. Farmers needed to work together to achieve their goals. Since 
past events had shown that farmers would not always come together, the leaders of the 
farm movements relied on the authority granted to them by the law to enforce unity 
among producers.
Currently, the Harper Conservative government is questioning the monopoly 
selling power of the Canadian Wheat Board. Western farmers recently voted to end the 
Board’s monopoly power over barley and then Federal Agriculture Minister Chuck Strahl 
further stated that monopoly control over wheat will be put to plebiscite in the near 
future. The Ontario Pork Producers are facing renewed challenges from many of their 
producer members, who are calling for the dismantling of the Marketing Board while 
other members are calling for an extension of the board’s powers. Meanwhile, a group of 
Ontario livestock growers hope to create a better situation for farm families and struggle 
to continue operation of their co-operative meat packing plant. These are just a few of 
the situations currently facing farmers’ organizations, which are all too reminiscent of 
difficulties faced by farmers and their organizations in the past. In light o f the challenges 
facing farmers now, an investigation of the history of these compulsory marketing boards 
is very important.
11 Ibid., 146.
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This study begins with an examination of early attitudes towards agriculture. As 
the socio-economic make-up of the nation changed, and as the government’s attitude 
towards farming shifted, so too did the methods the farmers used to organize, Before 
studying the Ontario hog producers groups the paper examines the organizational efforts 
of Canadian farmers preceding the development of marketing boards. This includes a 
look at organizational work that occurred in Ontario and in the Prairie provinces, from 
the establishment o f farmers’ grain companies, and various political movements and 
farmers’ political parties, such as the Progressives and the United Farmers, the wheat 
pools, and the establishment o f the Canadian Wheat Board in 1935. The chapter then 
examines other forms of farm organizations, with some recognition of different co­
operative and agricultural movements during the inter-war years. Successive chapters 
focus on the development of the Ontario Hog Producers Association and the Ontario Hog 
Producers Marketing Board, and consider the legal ramifications of central selling. The 
final chapter examines the FAME story and the state of the Ontario Hog Producers 
Marketing Boards until 1965, with a look at the position of other marketing boards in 
Ontario.
As the position of the farmer within Canadian society changed, so did the efforts 
of Canadian farmers to maintain their position in the economy. From voluntary 
organizations to government-enforced compulsory boards, farmers experimented with 
various kinds of organizations. While there was often opposition to agricultural 
organizations, strong leadership, such as that in the hog producers’ movement, brought 
farmers together to work for common goal and create organizations that improve the 
situation of all farmers. The leaders o f these organizations often saw the world as being
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
opposed to farmers, and this view encouraged the development o f further organizations 
based on poorly thought out ideals and models. The failure of these organizations and the 
view of the public towards these organizations often ended up undermining the strength 
and unity of the farmers’ movements. The challenges faced by the Hog Producers 
Association were reflective o f the challenges faced by numerous farm organizations, as 
detractors from within and without challenged them. Still, the leaders continued the 
struggle to ensure that they would improve society for themselves, their peers, and future 
generations of farmers.
The development of marketing boards marked a significant change in the 
agricultural landscape. No longer did organizations have to rely upon individual farmers 
to volunteer. Farmers, like workers, could be compelled to join unions, bringing together 
all individuals of a particular interest to fight for a common good. Farmers, like workers, 
had to fight large corporate interests in order to achieve a fair value for their labour.
While not all farmers were interested in maintaining membership, proponents of 
marketing boards successfully faced serious legal challenges. The work of the Hog 
Producers in Ontario set the limits other marketing boards operated under. The Hog 
Producers helped dispel the notion that livestock producers could not be organized like 
other farmers. The Hog Producers of Ontario were also the first to establish a central 
selling agency, a step that played a major role in the development of supply management 
groups. Farmers are often characterized as being opposed to organized labour and 
conservative in nature, but the story o f farmers’ co-operatives and the hog producers’ 
associations suggests otherwise.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Chapter One: Historiography
There is an extensive body of literature regarding the place of agriculture in 
Canadian history. The subjects of these works vary. Some examine farming as one of the 
‘staples’ o f the early Canadian economy, others focus on agricultures role in the 
development of the nation and industry, and others investigate the place of specific 
groups in Canada’s agricultural economy and the strategies such people employed to 
address their concerns. This thesis speaks to several themes in the historiography of 
agriculture. First, although agricultural production was and continues to be a major force 
in the economy, there is a vast body of work which focuses on the decline o f agriculture, 
particularly in Ontario, during the twentieth century. Secondly, historians have paid a 
great deal of attention to the many experiments farmers have performed in regards to 
political participation. Indeed, there are numerous histories which examine farmer forays 
into the political arena. And finally, historians have effectively traced the development of 
agricultural co-operatives and marketing agencies, focusing on what inspired farmers to 
take co-operative action, and examining how successful these endeavours were. This 
study builds on such works by looking at the post World War Two period, the use of 
marketing boards, and shifting attention from the wheat economy of the Prairie West to 
mixed-agriculture in Ontario.
Few people regard agriculture as an important industry in Ontario. Indeed, 
popular perception places the Prairie Provinces at the centre o f Canadian agriculture, and 
thus, much of the literature about agriculture in Canada has focused on the West. 
Nevertheless, agriculture has played a significant role in Ontario’s development and 
many histories address the importance of farming in the province during the nineteenth
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and early twentieth centuries. In his survey history, Ontario Since 1867, Joseph Schull 
offers a classic account o f how historians view the state of agriculture in Ontario. Schull 
suggests farming was important during the early period of Ontario history, particularly 
because farming drew immigrants to the region and encouraged sustained settlement. 
However, farming was later overshadowed during the interwar period by the growth of 
other industries such as mining and manufacturing.1 A condition Schull argues persisted 
into the post-War period. W.R. Young suggests this numerical decline was occurring as
early as the 1910s and caused considerable concern for the farm population in an earlier
2era. Marvin Mclnnis and Douglas McCalla argue that even though Ontario was 
industrializing, and farmers became outnumbered by urban dwellers, agriculture 
remained an important part of the provincial economy.3 Schull’s view is supported by the 
research o f other academics, such as W.M. Drummond and Lloyd Reeds, whose works 
look at the post-war era.4 Drummond and Reeds suggest Ontario’s rural population 
declined after the Second World War due to the availability of better paying jobs in urban
1 Joseph Schull, Ontario Since 1867, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978).
2 W.R. Young, ‘Conscription, Rural Depopulation, and the Farmers of Ontario, 1917-19,’ Canadian 
Historical Review  53, no. 3 (September 1972), 289-320.
3 Douglas McCalla, Planting the Province: The Economic History o f  Upper Canada, 1784-1870, (Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press, 1993); R. Marvin Mclnnis, Perspectives on Ontario Agriculture -  1815-1930, 
(Gananoque: Langdale Press, 1992).
4 W.M. Drummond, ‘The Impact of the Post-War Industrial Expansion on Ontario’s Agriculture,’ The 
Canadian Journal o f  Economics and Political Science 24, no. 1 (Feb 1958) 84-92; Lloyd G. Reeds, 
‘Agricultural Regions o f Southern Ontario 1880 and 1951,’ Economic Geography 34, no. 3 (July 1959): 
219-27; Ian M. Drummond, with Peter George, Kris Inwood, Peter W. Sinclair and Tom Traves, Progress 
Without Planning: The Economic o f  Ontario from  Confederation to the Second World War (Toronto: 
University o f  Toronto Press, 1987); William L. Marr, ‘The Wheat Economy in Reverse: Ontario’s Wheat 
Production, 1887-1917,’ The Canadian Journal o f  Economics 14, no. 1 (February 1981): K.J. Rea, The 
Prosperous Years: The Economic History o f  Ontario, 1939-1915 (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 
1985); G. Elmore Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, Volume 2, (Toronto: Saunders, 1970); 
Escott Reid, ‘The Effect o f the Depression on Canadian Politics, 1929-32,’ The American Political Science 
Review 27 no. 3 (June 1933); 455-465. J.W. Watson, ‘Rural Depopulation in Southwestern Ontario,’
Annals o f the Association o f  American Geographers 37, no. 3 (September 1947) 145-54; Dennis H. Wrong, 
‘Ontario Provincial Elections, 1934-55: A Preliminary Survey o f Voting,’ The Canadian Journal o f  
Economics and Political Science 23, no. 3 (Aug 1957): 395-403; Wrong, ‘The Pattern o f Party Voting in 
Canada,’ The Public Opinion Quarterly 21, no. 2 (Summer, 1957) 252-64.
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areas, and a more general shift in Ontario’s economy away from primary industries, such 
as farming, to manufacturing.
The decline o f agriculture, in economic and demographic terms, in Ontario is a 
popular theme among historians, but it is not entirely accurate. While the relative 
economic position of agriculture declined in the face of industrial expansion, a significant 
portion of the province’s population continued to rely on agriculture for employment in 
the post-war era. Agriculture remained a valuable enough industry in Ontario’s economy 
that farmers were able to force governments to create and maintain marketing boards.
This study builds on the foundation of earlier works by re-examining agriculture’s 
declining position in Ontario and considering actions taken by hog producers to address 
their precarious economic situation. Unlike many of the works dealing with agriculture in 
Ontario, this study goes beyond the Second World War, and argues agriculture remained 
an important industry in Ontario. Farmers played a major role in changing provincial 
laws, inspiring action among other Canadian farmers, and did not seek to acquire political 
power for themselves. While other histories argue agriculture’s importance in the Ontario 
economy deteriorated, in the face o f industrialization, this works suggests otherwise.
Canadian farmers experimented with direct political action many times during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Farmers across Ontario elected 
representatives of farmer’s movements, with mixed results. Historians note the political 
participation o f farmers met with limited success. Scholars such as Charles Johnston and 
Margaret Kechnie suggest internal divisions seriously undermined the grassroots support
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of the farmers’ government, especially the Drury Farmer-Labour government in Ontario,5 
Their works argue the United Farmers lacked political experience, thus dooming Drury’s 
government to failure. Flistorians also suggest farmers’ participation in politics seriously 
eroded the social, educational, and economic elements of the entire farm movement in 
Ontario because the attention of farmers was drawn away from those issues unique to 
agriculture. These histories reflect the general pattern established by academics 
investigating the foray o f farmers into politics across Canada.6 This pattern, however, 
places too much responsibility on the elected representatives and ignores other factors 
which undermined the farmer-politicians.
This work accepts the idea that political inexperience caused difficulties for farm 
governments, that the political decisions made by elected representatives damaged 
farmers’ organizations, and farmers’ political power was short-lived because public 
support for farmers quickly evaporated when they did not use their power “effectively.” 
However, this study does not place the failure of the political movement squarely on the 
elected officials. It looks at other factors that played an important role in weakening the 
political position of farmers. Demographics played a significant part in the downfall of 
the Drury government. Even if the Drury government had possessed political experience,
5 Charles M. Johnston, E.C. Drury: Agrarian Idealist (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1986); 
Margaret Kechnie, ‘The United Farm Women of Ontario: Developing a Political Consciousness,’ Ontario 
History 77, no. 4 (December 1985): 267-80.
6 James E. Boyle, ‘The Agrarian Movement in the Northwest,’ The American Economic Review 8, no. 3 
(September 1918): 505-21; William Irvine, The Farmer in Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1976); John A. Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1959); S.M. Lipset, ‘The Rural Community and Political Leadership in Saskatchewan,’ The Canadian 
Journal o f  Economics and Political Science 13, no. 3 (August 1947): 410-28; William Lewis Morton, The 
Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1950); R.S. Pennefather, ‘The Orange 
Order and the United Farmers of Ontario 1919-1923,’ Ontario History 69, no. 3 (1977): 169-84; Bradford 
James Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy: The United Farmers and Farm Women o f  Alberta, 1909- 
1921 (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 2000); Paul F. Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western 
Canada: A Survey Showing American Parallels (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1948); Brian
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it would have faced difficulty in maintaining power due to the precarious balance of seats 
in the legislature. Even by the 1920s, the growing urban population nearly outnumbered 
the rural population in the province and farmers could not expect to elect enough 
representatives to form a majority government. This work rejects the idea that the lack of 
success experienced by farmers in politics destroyed the groups’ movement. Rather, 
farmers were inspired by their failure in politics to investigate other avenues to improve 
their situation within society and the economy. This work recounts some of the 
techniques used by farmers, such as co-operative agencies and marketing boards.
Farmers’ movements took on many forms outside of the political arena, including 
the formation of social groups, experimenting with commodity pools, voluntary co­
operative organizations, and the establishment of government supported marketing 
boards. A significant body of literature looks at the development of Canadian agricultural 
organizations. However, most of these works, including the work of Garry Lawrence 
Fairbairn, focus on specific boards and organizations in western Canada.7 Fairbairn looks 
at the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, one of the longest surviving agricultural co-operatives. 
One of the conclusions Fairbairn draws is that Pools failed to survive, largely because of 
their voluntary nature. Many of the other academics writing about specific marketing 
groups agree with Fairbairn’s thesis. Additionally, the vast majority o f this literature 
concentrates on Western organizations, especially wheat pools and the Canadian Wheat
o
Board. Those works which look at co-operatives that do not focus on wheat tend to be
Tennyson, ‘The Ontario General Election o f 1919: The Beginnings o f Agrarian Revolt,’ Journal o f  
Canadian Studies 4, no. 1 (1969): 26-36.
7 Garry Lawrence Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots: The Remarkable Story o f  Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
(Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1984.
8 Walter P. Davisson, Pooling Wheat In Canada (Ottawa: Graphics Publishers Limited, 1927); ; Robert 
Irwin, ‘“The Better Sense of the Farm Population” : The Partridge Plan and Grain Marketing in 
Saskatchewan,’ Prairie Forum  18 no. 1 (Spring 1993): 35-52: Harald S. Patton, Grain Growers’
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written by supporters and former members of the organizations in question. For example, 
Wilfred Bishop, secretary for the Ontario hog producers, wrote the groups’ official 
history.9
Other historians examine the development of marketing boards as a revolutionary 
idea or moment in time.10 Ian MacPherson investigates why farmers abandoned co­
operatives and turned towards government mandated marketing boards. He argues the 
acceptance of marketing boards represented a recognition by farmers that they could not 
transform the economic structures which produced their problems, but had to work within 
the established system. MacPherson also suggests the development of marketing boards 
was inevitable because co-operatives failed to maintain their membership.11 By
Cooperation in Western Canada, (reprint of 1928 edi. New York: AMS Press, 1969); Patton, ‘The Market 
Influence o f  the Canadian Wheat Pool,’ Journal o f  the American Statistical Association 24, no. 165 (March 
1929): 210-18; Patton, ‘The Canadian Grain Pool,’ Pacific Affairs 3, no. 2 (February 1930): 165-80; Patton, 
‘Observations on Canadian Wheat Policy Since the World War,’ The Canadian Journal o f  Economics and 
Political Science 3, no. 2 (May 1937): 218-33.
9 Wilfred L. Bishop, Men and Pork Chops: A History o f  the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board 
(London, ON: Phelps Publishing Co, 1977).
10 Kerry Badgley, ‘“Co-operation Pays and Pays Well” : Co-operatives and the State in Ontario, 1914 to 
1930,’ Canadian Papers in Rural History 10 (1996): 165-90; Ian M. Drummond, ‘Marketing Boards in the 
White Dominions, with Special Reference to Australia and Canada’, in Argentina, Australia and Canada: 
Studies in Comparative Development, 1870-1965, ed D.C.M. Platt and Guido Di Telia (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1985), 194-206; W.M. Drummond, ‘The Role of Agricultural Marketing Boards,’ The 
Canadian Economy: Selected Readings, eds. John J. Deutsch, Burton S. Keirstead, Kari Levitt and Robert 
M. Will (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965): 246-56; Christopher Green, ‘Agricultural Marketing Boards in 
Canada: An Economic and Legal Analysis,’ The University o f  Toronto Law Journal 33, no. 4 (Autumn, 
1983), 407-33; Grace H. Larsen and Henry E. Erdman, ‘Aaron Sapiro: Genius o f Farm Co-operative 
Promotion,’ The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 49, no. 2 (September, 1962): 242-68; Mathew O. 
Tobriner, ‘Cooperative Marketing and the Restraint of Trade,’ Columbia Law Review  27, no.7 (Nov 1927): 
827-36.
"  Ian MacPherson, The Co-operative Movements on the Prairies, 1900-1955 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical 
Association Books, 1979); ‘An Authoritative Voice: The Reorientation o f the Canadian Farmers’ 
M ovement, 1935 to 1945,’ H istorical Papers (1979): 164-81; Each fo r  All: A H istory o f  the Co-operative 
Movement in English Canada, 1900-45 (Ottawa: Carleton, 1979); Building and Protecting the Co­
operative Movement: A B rief History o f  the Co-operative Union o f  Canada 1909-1984 (Ottawa: Co­
operative Union of Canada, 1984); “ ‘Better Tractors for Less Money” : The Establishment of Canadian Co­
operative Implements Limited,’ Manitoba History 13, no. 2 (1987): 2-11; ‘Missionaries of Rural 
Development: The Fieldman of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 1925-1965,’ Agricultural History 60, no. 2 
(1986): 73-96; ‘Creating Stability Amid Degrees of Marginality: Divisions in the Struggle for Orderly 
Marketing in British Columbia, 1900-1940,’ in Canadian Papers in Rural History, ed. Donald H. Akenson 
(Gananoque: Langdale Press, 1990): 309-334; ‘Some Fortune and a Little Fame: Co-operatives as Ladders 
for Upward Mobility in the Canadian West,’ Journal o f  the West 43, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 36-43.
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examining the decline o f co-operatives and the development of stronger boards this work 
builds on the position established by MacPherson.
This study differs from conventional farming scholarship because it moves away 
from the geographical focus on the west and wheat to look at co-operatives and 
marketing boards in Ontario. By drawing connections between the movements in 
Ontario, the Canadian West, and the rest of the world my work places the actions of 
Ontario hog producers within a transnational framework. In addition, my research looks 
at the role of livestock co-operatives in the post-World War Two period, a subject which 
has not received a great deal of attention. The diversification of the agricultural economy 
in Ontario has gone relatively unexamined. Hog producers, like the Ontario Hog 
Producers Marketing Board, established single-desk selling in Ontario. Farmers rejected 
co-operatives in favour o f marketing boards because government mandated marketing 
boards clearly wielded more power, making co-operatives nearly unworkable. My work 
draws heavily upon the work and collected papers of Wilfred Bishop and strives to place 
it in context with developments in the wider agricultural movement.
This thesis contributes to the history of agriculture in several particular ways. It 
examines the decline of the rural population in Ontario, the political and economic 
actions farmers adopted following the shift in Ontario’s economy, and the efforts of 
farmers to retain their economic and social position. By exploring the changing methods 
employed by farmers this study places the group within broader developments in the 
economy. This thesis is a significant addition to the study of Canadian agriculture 
because it provides a much-needed look into the position of Ontario’s farming industry 
after the Second World War. By rejecting the notion that agriculture is of minimal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
importance in Ontario, this study shows that even as the total number of farmers declined, 
they developed strong organizations to protect themselves, and called upon the 
government to create marketing boards.
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Chapter Two: Building the Farmers’ Movement
Farming has represented many different things in Canadian history. Governments 
used agriculture in the process of nation building, to encourage settlement and to create a 
physical claim to the land. For many, agriculture was a way of life, allowing them to live 
off the land and scratch out an existence dependant on no one. By the mid to late 
nineteenth century, agriculture moved beyond the level of subsistence farming and 
became a major economic force. As part of a major industry, farmers were concerned 
with their role in the nation and organized political pressure groups to deal with their 
changing economic circumstances. These groups were largely ineffective, as farmers 
found they had little influence on the political direction of the country. As Canada 
expanded west, the Dominion government encouraged agricultural development of the 
prairies. During the first few decades of the twentieth century, the farm population and 
the economic strength of agriculture increased substantially. However, prairie farmers 
felt that they were not receiving their fair share o f the national wealth and that large 
eastern corporations continued to control agricultural prices. Inspired by these feelings, 
prairie farmers organized in a variety of ways: from developing their own co-operative 
companies to forming political parties or lobby groups. As agriculture became a major 
factor in the Canadian economy, the farmers achieved influence in government policy­
making, an unprecedented power for the farmers. The lessons learned from these 
organization experiments would serve Ontario’s hog farmers in the era after the Second 
World War, as they attempted to develop their organizations.
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Before Confederation, state support for agriculture under the French and later the 
British regime often took the form of agricultural societies which provided information 
on farming in the North American climate. Much of the support for agriculture took the 
form of granting free land to settlers. The various colonial and provincial governments 
did not see agriculture as important in its own right, but instead viewed agriculture as a 
way of supporting other economic endeavours such as the fur trade. Agriculture provided 
wheat for settlement in Lower Canada and more than half o f the population in the region 
were employed in agriculture.1 After Confederation, the position of Canadian farmers 
changed. As the fur trade ended, the new staples of the Canadian economy became 
timber and wheat. The Dominion government used agriculture as a way to advance its 
geographical boundaries. In 1871, agriculture was the major extractive industry in 
Ontario, but this did not mean that agriculture was the major focus of Ontario or 
Canada’s economy. The government encouraged the wheat trade in order to help 
manufacturing and capital interests, because farmers were a convenient market for the 
manufactured goods of Canadian industry. Farmers also required banking services and 
loans to establish themselves. Many people moved from urban dwellings to farms and the 
process o f “farm making” provided an important market for manufacturing interests.3
The Dominion government focused on encouraging more individuals to farm in 
Canada. Drawing on the experience of the United States, Canadian leaders felt the nation 
could achieve prosperity through immigration and agricultural settlement.4 Government
1 Mclnnis and McCalla provide extensive information on this topic in their works.
2 Drummond et al, Progress Without Planning, 21.
3 Gordon Darroch, ‘Class in nineteenth century, central Canada,’ in Class, Gender and Region: Essays in 
Canadian Historical Sociology, ed Gregory S. Kealey (St Johns: Committee on Canadian Labour History, 
1988), 55; Mclnnis, Perspectives on Ontario Agriculture, 104.
4 Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, 10.
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propaganda produced between 1873 and 1883 intended to encourage immigration 
emphasized Ontario’s role as a wheat-growing and wheat-exporting province.5 Other 
propaganda encouraged immigration to the Canadian West, touting the fertility of the soil 
and targeting immigrants from both the United States and Europe.6 Early Canadian 
Ministers of Agriculture concentrated their efforts on encouraging immigration in the 
hopes that more immigration would improve the agricultural capacity of the province.
The focus on agriculture was successful as, between 1851 and 1881, immigration to 
Ontario’s rural regions was greater than it was to Ontario’s cities.7 By the 1870s, 
agriculture was a major force within the Canadian economy, and the farmers, once 
separated and distant, were becoming concerned with the political and social situation of 
the country. In the years immediately following Confederation, Ontario farmers were the 
lead producers o f agricultural goods in Canada. As late as 1891, nearly 53 per cent of 
Canadian wheat production took place in Ontario.8 The 1871 Ontario census shows that 
the agricultural class made up 49 per cent of the province’s work force, a figure that did 
not include the wives or children o f farmers.9 By 1891, this figure had increased slightly 
to 52 per cent.10
As the number and importance of farmers increased, Canadian farmers began 
organizing into groups free of government interference. As the position of farmers in the 
economy and society changed, educational organizations connected to the government no 
longer met the needs of farmers and new organizations run by farmers met with success.
5 Porritt, ‘Canada’s National Grain Route,’ 346.
6 Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, 12.
7 J.W. Watson, ‘Rural Depopulation in Southwestern Ontario,’149.
8 Marr, ‘The Wheat Economy in Reverse,’ 136.
9 Drummond et al, Progress Without Planning, 5-6.
10 Watson, ‘Rural Depopulation in Southwestern Ontario,’ 150.
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The first of these organizations, one which defined all later farm organizations, was the
Patrons o f Husbandry, or the Grange, which came to Canada from the United States in
1872.11 The Grange initially entered Canada through Quebec, with the first Ontario local
organized in 1874 and the first in Manitoba organized in 1876. By 1879, there were over
31,000 members of the Canadian Grange, with 26,000 in Ontario alone, organized into 
12766 local granges. The Grange operated as a secret society like the Freemasons, but the 
group allowed only farmers to be members.13 The Grange, like earlier farmers’ groups, 
encouraged instruction in the art and science of husbandry, the diversification of crops, 
and ways to make farmlands more self-sustaining. The Grange also hoped to bring 
producers and consumers closer together.
The organization strictly forbade involvement in politics. Locals could not 
support candidates, but the Grange encouraged the education of political candidates 
regarding the needs of farmers. The Grange proposed a number o f policies that both 
provincial and Dominion governments eventually accepted.14 It was however, difficult 
for the Grange to remain completely uninvolved in politics and many members 
campaigned as Independents rather than as representatives o f the Grange Order.15 Since 
Grange leaders felt farmers were exploited by corporations and middlemen and wanted to 
assist farmers in avoiding debt, the Grange experimented with commercial endeavours.
"  Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy, 259; Good, Farmer Citizen, 61; Johnston, E.C. Drury: Agrarian 
Idealist, 13; Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 18; Wood, History o f  the Farmers ' 
Movement, 13; Wood also provides a history o f the Granges’ development in the United States, 22-29; 
Rawlins suggests that the National Grange of the United States played a major role in almost every change 
that had occurred to improve agriculture in the United States since its inception, 127.
12 Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 18-20; Wood, History o f  the Farmers ’ 
Movement, 60.
13 Ibid., 28.
14 Johnston, E.C. Drury, 14; Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 14; Reaman, A History o f  
Agriculture in Ontario, 82; Schulz, Rise and Fall o f Canadian Farm Organizations, 20; Wood,
History o f the Farmers ’ Movement, 45-46;
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The group established a number of co-operative stores. The Grange Wholesale Supply 
Company, established in 1879 and based in Toronto, focused on direct purchasing in bulk 
from manufacturers.16 The Grange was also responsible for bringing the co-operative 
movement to the Prairies. The Grange’s encouragement of co-operative purchasing 
included providing goods for independent buying clubs and establishing co-operative 
retail stores. The Grange also encouraged the establishment of independent farmers’ 
elevators.17
The foray of the Grange into co-operative business ventures paralleled the
entrance o f farmers into the commercial-capitalist economy, or their efforts to catch up 
18with this economy. Before the commercial-capitalist economy developed, and before 
farmers were involved in such an economy, there would not have been a need for any 
commercial organization. Farmers existed at a largely subsistence level, often supplying 
all they needed, trading their surpluses with other farmers and small artisans. As farmers 
integrated into the wider economy, their needs increased and their production became 
more specialized. Increasingly, farmers relied on other larger companies to produce the 
necessary goods. The farmers’ interest in the Grange reflected the desire of farmers to co­
operate with each other, in order to meet their shared needs and requirements in a 
changing world.
The ambitions of the Grange eventually caused the decline in its membership and 
farmer support. While the group was centrally organized, the expansion of the Grange 
into commercial enterprises created weakness in the order and aroused opposition from
15 Good, Farmer Citizen, 64.
16 Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy, 259; Rennie, The Rise o f Agrarian Democracy, 14; Schulz, Rise 
and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 22; Wood, History o f  the F arm er’s Movement, 26.
17 MacPherson, ‘The Co-operative Movement on the Prairies, 1900-1955,’ 3.
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people outside o f the farm population, including the popular media.19 Entering into 
business ventures, many poorly organized, proved to be an area o f weakness for the 
Grange, and when some of the co-operative ventures failed, the popularity of the group 
declined. The rise of department stores in large towns and cities also significantly 
weakened the retail co-operatives of the Grange.21 Some people involved in the Grange 
suggested it declined due to the unattractive nature of the Grange as a secret society and 
the fact that the Grange was no longer the only organization educating farmers.22
While the fortunes of the Grange were rising and falling, another organization, the 
Patrons o f Industry, entered Canada from the United States. The Patrons of Industry first 
organized in Port Huron, Michigan in 1887. The first Canadian lodge appeared in 
Mandaumin, Ontario, near Sarnia in 1889, with lodges quickly following in Lambton, 
Kent, and Middlesex counties. A separate Canadian organization o f the Patrons of 
Industry formed in February 1891.23 This organization had many of the same objectives 
as the Grange, and existed as an independent group for farmers, free from government 
control. However, the Patrons of Industry varied significantly from the Grange in its 
support o f a strong role for the state, advocating direct group action in politics and an 
alliance with organized labour.24 The Patrons of Industry also created a commercial farm 
organization, establishing co-operatives such as the Binder Twine Company in 1892. 
Prices of binder twine fell immediately after the establishment o f the company, gaining
18 Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 14.
19 Wood, History o f  the Farmers' Movement, 63.
20 Drury, Farmer Premier, 52.
21 Schull, Ontario Since 1867, 135.
22 Good, Farmer Citizen, 63; Good also suggested that the organization may have been undermined by 
individuals attempting to use the organization to gain personal power or gain.
23 Wood, History o f  the Farmers ’ Movement, 110-12; Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 82; 
Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 14; Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 33.
24 Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 13.; Wood, History o f  the Farmers ’ Movement, 120.
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credit for the company.25 In the West, the Patrons dealt in agricultural implements, binder 
twine, and other supplies farmers needed. The Patrons also acted, to a limited extent, as a 
selling agency for farmers’ grain and produce.26
The Patrons worked in a variety o f ways to publicize the concerns of the agrarian 
population to the wider society. The Patrons’ efforts to advocate for farmers’ interests 
led to the establishment of the Canada Farmer’s Sun, which became the newspaper for 
agrarian interests in Ontario.27 Established in London, Ontario in 1891, the Farmer’s Sun 
played an important role in the development of many Ontario farmers’ movements, 
including the Patrons. Publication of the Farmer’s Sun continued under that name until 
it was renamed the Weekly Sun in 193 3.29 To serve the farmers o f the West, the Patrons 
published the Patrons’ Advocate, out of Rapid City, Manitoba, in 1891.30 The Patrons 
also acted as a political outlet for farmers’ frustrations. In a provincial by-election in 
1894, a candidate of the Patrons of Industry won the Ontario riding of North Bruce. The 
following 1894 Ontario General Election saw sixteen Patrons’ members elected to the 
Ontario Legislature.31
Farmers supported the Patrons as representatives to address their concerns 
regarding the changing economy. By this time, the rural vote in Ontario was losing 
ground to the urban vote. While the rural population still represented nearly 57 per cent 
of the population, this percentage was dropping quickly.32 Some politicians, including 
Ontario Conservative Leader James Pliny Whitney, viewed the Patrons of Industry as a
25 Ibid., 119.
26 Ibid., 126.
27 Johnston, E.C. Drury, 16.
28 Good, Farmer Citizen, 65.
29 Ibid., 238.
30 Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 35.
31 Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 83.
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tool of the Liberals.33 The long held powers of the Liberal party relied largely on the 
continued support of the farmers. In order to maintain power, Liberal Premier Oliver 
Mowat hoped to bring the Patrons into the Liberal camp.34
The Patrons represented an effort by the farm population to capitalize on the rural 
vote while it was still significant in the province. The Patrons took a number of rather 
progressive political stances, including the enfranchisement of women, the abolition of 
the Senate, tariff reductions on necessary items, and opposition to the CPR monopoly of 
the grain elevator companies in the West.35 The Patrons’ alliance with organized labour 
reflected the belief that political oppression by the ‘non-producing’ rich was responsible 
for the economic problems of farmers and workers.36 Despite such ‘radical’ positions, the 
Patrons lost a great deal of support because many of these progressive stances did not 
form the Patrons’ official platform. This change in policy upset many of its members.37 In 
the provincial legislature, the Patrons did not take a strong stance on issues and few of 
their motions were considered. Instead, the group engaged in ‘sniping operations’, 
making personal attacks, and criticizing other government policy without suggesting 
viable alternatives, which many voters considered to be a poor use o f power.
At its peak in 1895, the Patrons of Industry counted nearly 55,000 members in 
Canada, with the vast majority of it membership in Ontario and Quebec. The failure of 
Patrons’ MLAs to exercise their political power led to the decline o f the Patrons. Like the
32 Schull, Ontario Since 1867, 134.
33 Ibid., 125.
34 Wood, History o f  the Farm er’s Movement, 135.
35 Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 35-36; Wilson, Beyond the Harvest, 241; Wood, 
History o f the Farm er’s Movement, 114.
36 Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 15; Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations,
35
37 Wood, History o f  the Farmer's Movement, 117.
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Grange, the Patrons fast popularity was followed by a massive decline in support. 
Although a number o f Patrons contested the 1896 federal general election, voters elected 
only four Patrons’ representatives.39 By the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
Patrons had lost their last two seats in the legislature and much o f their membership.40 
The political failure of the Patrons discouraged farmers from becoming involved in direct 
politics.41 It also undermined the entire Patrons movement, and was responsible for the 
meteoric decline in membership, respect and interest in the organization.42 The greatest 
success o f the Patron’s project lay in the binder twine company, and was emblematic of 
the potential of co-operative action.43
The Grange and the Patrons of Industry reflected the first major development in 
agricultural organizing. The Grange and Patrons represented the first o f many strategies 
adopted by Canadian farmers and their organizations to meet the changing economic 
situation faced by the agrarian population.44 Farmers joined the Patrons of Industry 
because they wanted to take an active role in the marketing of their products. Even 
though the group failed, the intent and interest remained.45 By 1900, the Grange and the 
Patrons o f Industry had all but disappeared in Canada. In Ontario, the focus of 
organizing became Farmers’ Institutes, which were government-sponsored groups similar
38 Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 37; Wood, History o f  the Farm er’s Movement, 
142.
49 Good, Farmer Citizen, 68.
40 Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 83.
41 Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 53.
42 Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 83; Good, Farmer Citizen, 69; MacPherson, ‘The Co­
operative Movement on the Prairies,’ 4.
43 Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 15.
44 MacPherson, ‘An Authoritative Voice: The Reorientation o f the Canadian Farmers’ Movement, 1935 to 
1945’, 164-65.
45 Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 10.
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to the earlier Farmers’ Clubs.46 Following the collapse of the Patrons of Industry the 
farmers’ movement in Ontario nearly disappeared and thus, was the low point of farmers’ 
movements in Ontario 47 
The Shift from  East to West
While farmers’ organizations in Ontario suffered through this nadir, the Canadian 
West witnessed the development o f a strong agrarian movement. Through the last two 
decades o f the nineteenth century, as the Dominion government’s efforts to build up the 
West were realized: the centre of Canada’s wheat area shifted from Ontario to the 
prairies.48 Manitoba first exported wheat in 1884. The territorial areas, later known as 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, began exporting wheat in 1892 and 1898 respectively.49 Even 
before the territories began exporting wheat, it was apparent that the Prairies had great 
agricultural potential.50
As the wheat economy expanded in the West, agriculture in Ontario continued to 
diversify. This process had already been underway for quite some time in the province, 
and as a result of agricultural fairs and the settlement of people from different 
nationalities livestock rearing, dairying, and market gardening grew in importance.51 
Since prices provided by livestock were more predictable than those provided by wheat, 
Ontario farmers turned to rearing livestock.52 As late as 1891, Ontario still contributed 
nearly 53 per cent o f Canadian wheat production. By 1921 this had dropped to just under
46 Drury, F arm er Premier, 48-49.
47 Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 41; Wood, History o f  the Farm er’s Movement, 
147.
48 Mclnnis, Perspectives on Ontario Agriculture, 113.
49 Porritt, ‘Canada’s National Grain Route,’ 348-49.
50 In 1887, the first wheat boom year for the Prairies, Manitoba exported 3,876,000 bushels of wheat. 1887 
also saw the organization of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange; Ibid., 350.
51 McCalla, Planting the Province, 88; Reeds, ‘Agricultural Regions of Southern Ontario,’ 221.
32 Marr, ‘The Wheat Economy in Reverse,’ 138.
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5 per cent, and farms in Saskatchewan and Alberta provided just over 78 per cent of 
Canada’s wheat. This shift in agricultural production led to the establishment of 
agricultural organizations in Manitoba throughout the 1890s, including the Farmers’ 
Alliance, the Patrons of Industry and a Farmers’ Union in the 1880s. However, 
significant organization was not achieved on the Prairies until the twentieth century.54
As agriculture developed in Western Canada, farmers once again faced the 
monopoly control of wheat shipping exercised by elevator companies and railways. 
Prairie wheat farmers felt that the elevator companies were guilty of under-grading, 
under-weighing, and over-docking wheat shipments.55 Farmers also believed grain 
elevators worked together to ensure prices paid to farmers remained low.56 With a 
growing farm population and the development of the wheat economy in the West, it was 
difficult for governments to ignore the worries of farmers. Several members of the 
Liberal government expressed concerns regarding the monopoly situation. The Minister 
of Railways and Canals was questioned about existing agreements between elevator 
companies and the Canadian Pacific Railway, whereby the Railway would only accept
e n
grain from elevator companies and not farmers, thus allowing a monopoly. Others MPs 
questioned the protection provided to industry, including the tariff protection on
53 Ibid., 136.
54 Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 26; Wood, History o f  the Farm er’s Movement, 
124-25.
53 Under-grading involved telling farmers that there wheat was a lower grade than it actually was and 
selling the wheat at a higher grade. Under-weighing involved tampering with the scales to show less wheat 
than was actually present. Over-docking involved telling the farmer that more grain was lost during 
transport than actually was.
56 Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 2; Grain Growers Record, 2; Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm 
Organizations, 45.
37 On 11 February 1898, Mr R.L. Richardson MP for Lisgar, and member o f the Liberal Party, asked the 
Minister of Railways and Canals Andrew George Blair, this and also questioned whether such a deal would 
be contrary to the General Railway Act. Minister Blair responded that he was not aware of any such 
agreement but agreed that it would be contrary to section 246 of the Railway Act. Canada, Parliament, 
House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 11 February 1898, 439.
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agricultural implements. Such actions had little impact because these questions were 
often attempts to attack the government on agricultural issues in order to gain support for 
their own party.
There were, however, some concessions made by the government to respond to 
the complaints o f farmers. In 1898, Liberal James M. Douglas, M.P. for East Assiniboia, 
introduced a bill in the House of Commons regarding the transportation of grain in 
Manitoba and the Northwest Territories and, in 1899 the Laurier Liberal government 
appointed a Royal Commission to investigate grain marketing in the West. Douglas 
believed this motion was necessary because many farmers had come to question the state 
of the grain trade. He further suggested that secret arrangements between the big elevator 
companies and the CP Railway had cost farmers and the smaller grain dealers of 
Manitoba nearly $1,000,000 in one year.59 The Royal Commission found that a complete 
and unregulated monopoly did exist in the Canadian grain trade, and in 1900 the 
Dominion Parliament passed the Manitoba Grain Act to regulate the trade.60 This Act 
created the position of Warehouse Commissioner, to oversee and supervise the grain 
trade. 61 In order to break the monopoly of the elevator companies, the Act also forced the 
railway to allow farmers to use loading platforms as opposed to elevators.62 The Royal 
Commission, the Manitoba Grain Act, and the subsequent actions by the Dominion
58 30 March 1898, Mr. N.F. Davin MP for West Assiniboia, of the Liberal-Conservative party motioned for 
agricultural implements to be added to the free list. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official 
Report of Debates, 30 March 1898, 2825-26, 3170. While stating that this was for the sake of the people of 
the North West Territories, it seems Davin was attempting to use the motion to attack the government more 
than as a means to support the farmers, citing previous promises made by the Liberals that they failed to 
follow through on.
59 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, February, March 1898, 450, 2059- 
60, 2081.
60 Boyle, ‘Agrarian Movement in the Northwest,’ 507-8; Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 3; MacGibbon, 
‘Grain Legislation Affecting Western Canada,’ 227.
61 Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy, 245.
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government reflected the growing importance of agriculture.63 While this reflected the 
importance of agriculture in the Canadian economy, Fowke suggests the Dominion 
government established the Royal Commission to ensure agriculture would continue to 
expand and the national policy would come to full fruition.64 Whatever the reasons for 
the appointment of the commission, the end of the nineteenth century was a period when 
the Dominion government, under pressure from farmers, worked to assist agriculture 
against corporate interests.
While the Dominion government provided some protection current political 
farmers were not entirely willing to trust their prosperity to the solicitude of other parties. 
Prairie farmers were dissatisfied with the failure of the railway companies to adhere to 
the Manitoba Grain Act, and a group organized to force the Canadian Pacific Railway to 
provide loading platforms for w heat.65 On 18 December 1901, a group of farmers met at 
Indian Head, Northwest Territories, to organize the Territorial Grain Growers’ 
Association (TGGA). W.R. Motherwell was elected Chair. In what became known as 
the ‘Sintaluta Test Case’ the TGGA took the CPR to court for violating the Manitoba 
Grain Act by favouring elevator companies when distributing rail cars. The TGGA won 
and railway companies were forced to follow government regulations. The success of the 
‘Sintaluta Test Case’ brought much attention to the farmers’ cause and showed, if they 
acted together, farmers could have real power.66 Following the Sintaluta Test Case,
62 Boyle, ‘Agrarian Movement in the Northwest,’ 508.
63 Between 1899 and 1939, the Dominion government appointed seven commissions to investigate the 
western grain trade and the Prairie provinces also appointed numerous commissions, with Saskatchewan 
investigating agricultural problems over twenty times between 1905 and 1945; see Fowke, ‘Royal 
Commissions and Canadian Agricultural Policy,’ 166-67.
64 Ibid., 167-68.
65 Lipset, ‘The Rural Community and Political Leadership in Saskatchewan,’ 410.
66 Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 48.
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membership in the TGGA boomed, and led to the organization o f the Manitoba Grain 
Growers’ Association (MGGA), in 1903, with J.W. Scallion as President.67
As most o f the early farmers on the Prairies came from Ontario or the United 
States, many of the early leaders o f the Prairie farm movement brought experience from 
other farmers’ movements, such as the Grange, to the Prairies.68 The TGGA initially 
focused on lobbying and educational activities, with the intention of being non-partisan, 
non-political, and non-trading, but the members became increasingly concerned about 
how the major grain companies and the Winnipeg Grain Exchange controlled the sale of 
Prairie grain.
The farmers’ movement in Alberta did not develop in as unified a manner as the 
organizations elsewhere on the Prairies. Due to the mixed agriculture that dominated 
Alberta, the Territorial Grain Growers’ Association did not take hold in Alberta as 
strongly as it did on the rest o f the Prairies.69 A number of farmers’ organizations sought 
the support of Alberta’s farmers, but by 1908 one farmers group, with the official title of 
the United Farmers of Alberta -  Our Motto Equity, had become dominant.70 The new 
group co-ordinated with other Grain Growers’ Associations, ensuring that while the UFA 
defended the rights of all Albertan farmers and not just grain growers, the UFA was part
67 Boyle, ‘Agrarian Movement in the Northwest,’508; Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy, 246; Grain 
Growers' Record, 4\ Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 46; Wilson, Beyond the 
Harvest, 241.
68 Patton, Grain Growers ’ Cooperation in Western Canada, 375; Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western 
Canada, 33.
69 Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 20.
70 This name was a compromise and reflected the two groups that came together to form the UFA, the 
Society of Equity and the Alberta Farmers’ Association. The Society of Equity, originally the American 
Society of Equity, could not draw much support due to fear of influence from the US, but the Alberta 
Farmers’ Association, originally a local of the TGGA, was not popular enough to eliminate the Society of 
Equity. After realizing that it did not benefit farmers for the groups to be fighting, the organizations 
formed a united group. For more information on the early farmers’ movements in Alberta, see Patton, 
Grain Growers Cooperation, 115; Rennie, The Rise o f Agrarian Democracy, 23-24; Sharp, Agrarian 
Revolt in Western Canada, 34; and Wood, History o f  the Farmer’s Movement, 199-200.
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of the wider prairie farm movement.71 Unlike the Grain Growers’ Associations, the farm 
groups in Alberta focused on broader agricultural problems, including efforts to improve 
hog marketing in Alberta. The Alberta organizations worked together to obtain the 
appointment of a provincial commission to consider the establishment of a government 
pork-packing plant and to lessen dependence on the ‘packing monopoly.’72 The Alberta 
farmers’ movement developed more slowly than the Grain Growers’ Associations but it 
ensured the UFA would represent the concerns of all farmers in Alberta, and not just 
grain growers.
The TGGA was very suspicious of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. As a result, in 
1904 the TGGA appointed E.A. Partridge to investigate the workings of the Winnipeg 
Grain Exchange. Partridge had difficulty obtaining any information regarding the grain 
trade, and advocated farmers form their own grain company in order to reform grain 
marketing.73 When Sintaluta area farmers organized the Grain Growers’ Grain Company 
(GGGC) in 1906, they decided that all shareholders would be farmers, no shareholder 
could hold more than four shares, and no shareholder could have more than one vote.74 
While Partridge requested the Grain Growers’ Associations endorse the plans o f the 
Grain Growers’ Grain Company, the company was never officially connected to the 
GGA. Such a relationship would have caused questions and created problems regarding 
control o f the company. Separate organizations allowed both the GGGC and the
• • 75Associations to act freely without undue interference from the other organization.
71 Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 37.
72 Ibid., 23; Wood, History o f  the Farm er’s Movement, 201.
73 Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation, 44.
74 Grain Growers' Record, 5; MacPherson, ‘The Co-operative Movements on the Prairies, 1900-1955’, 5; 
Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation, 45.
75 Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation, 47.
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The company faced some difficulties in its first year but, by September 1906, the 
GGGC began operations in a one-room office in Winnipeg.76 The Company handled its 
first carload of grain on 21 September 1906 and, by the middle o f October, the company 
was handling almost one hundred carloads a week.77 It appeared the GGGC would be 
successful, but the development of the company did not progress as smoothly as the
7fi
farmers hoped. Following the battle to obtain a seat on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, 
the GGGC had to abandon any plans to offer patronage dividends, effectively destroying 
any hope of the GGGC’s acting as a co-operative.79 The farmers still hoped to use the 
GGGC as a commission agent, thereby reducing the rate of profit the private grain 
marketing companies were making on farmers’ products.80 Despite the difficulties of its 
first year, the GGGC handled 2,500,000 bushels of grain and made a net profit of $790.81 
In its second year of operation, the GGGC achieved a profit of $40,190.82 While the 
company was not officially a co-operative, it was a farmers’ company and was able to 
perform the task o f educating farmers about the inner workings o f the Grain Exchange.
76 The Dominion government initially denied the GGGC a federal charter, but the Manitoba government 
granted it a provincial charter. As the 1906 crop season approached, the company still did not have a seat 
on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, nor did they have the money to buy it, despite the stock selling 
campaign. The farmers from Sintaluta came to the rescue and provided the additional $1,500 necessary for 
the purchase of a seat on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, granting the GGGC access to the trading 
organization. Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation, 48-49.
77 Grain Growers' Record, 7; Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation, 49.
78 Discussions within GGGC circulars about offering patronage dividends suggested the company would be 
operating as a co-operative, which violated the rules o f the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. The company 
promptly lost its seat on the exchange. Another co-operative, the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society 
assisted the GGGC, by purchasing grain directly from the company and the MGGA pressured the Manitoba 
government to reinstate the GGGC on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. The Manitoba government also 
acted to ensure that the Grain Exchange could not regulate the practice o f  its members. Grain Growers ' 
Record, 8; MacPherson, ‘The Co-operative Movement on the Prairies,’ 5; Patton, Grain Growers 
Cooperation, 52-54.
79 MacPherson, ‘The Co-operative Movement on the Prairies,’ 5; Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation, 55- 
56.
80 Lipset, ‘The Rural Community and Political Leadership in Saskatchewan,’ 410.
81 Grain Growers ’ Record, 10; Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation, 62.
82 Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation, 67.
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The company continued to operate successfully for a number o f years and 
undertook a variety o f other ventures. In 1908, the company established the Grain 
Growers Guide, to serve as an organ for western farmers.83 In 1909, the Company 
established its own printing plant to print the Guide and to engage in other forms of 
commercial printing. The new company, Public Press Limited, was self-financing within 
a reasonable time. Through 1908 and 1909, the GGGC opened an office in Calgary and 
established a Seed Branch, which included a Seed Improvement Department and an 
Inspection Department.85 Through these services, the GGGC aimed to improve the 
farmers’ returns as well as provide them with the necessary education to improve their 
financial positions. While officially separate from the Grain Growers’ Associations and 
the UFA, the Company provided them with substantial financial support. From 1909 to 
1914, the Company provided over $25,000 for the operation of the three provincial 
groups and an additional $60,000 for educational work.86 The success of the GGGC 
demonstrated the potential of a strong and unified prairie farmers’ movement, creating a
87solidarity that did not exist in the United States. However, the company’s success did
not solve all the problems facing farmers. First, while the organizers intended the GGGC
to be a farmers’ company, the demands of the grain dealers prevented the Company from
operating as a co-operative. Additionally, there were individuals who owned shares in
the company who were not farmers nor involved in any aspects o f grain growing,
8 8 • •undermining the claim that the GGGC was solely a farmers’ company. Finally, despite
83 Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 53.
84 Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation, 72.
83 Grain Growers' Record, 10.
86 Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, 35.
87 Ibid., 36.
88 MacGibbon, ‘Grain Legislation Affecting Western Canada,’ 233.
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the presence o f the farmers in the Grain Exchange, farmers still faced mistreatment by the 
elevator companies.
In the winter of 1907-08, concern over the actions o f the elevator companies led, 
in the winter of 1907-08, to the farmers’ organizations in all three Prairie Provinces to 
call for the Dominion Government to operate the terminal and transfer elevators in 
Canada and for the Provincial governments to operate the line elevators. Following the 
farmers’ requests, the Prairie premiers met in 1908-09, and decided that each province 
should deal with the request in its own way. The premiers were unwilling to create a
OQ
government-controlled monopoly.
The actions taken by the provinces varied considerably. In 1909, Manitoba’s 
Conservative government responded to a petition signed by over 10,000 farmers, 
announcing the government would allow the creation of a system of initial elevators. The 
government purchased or constructed a number of elevators and placed them under the 
control of an independent commission. By February 1911, the Commission had 
purchased 163 elevators and ten more were under construction, paying $814,710 for all 
the elevators, a vast overpayment. The opposition in the provincial assembly accused the 
Roblin Conservative government of not bothering to obtain the elevators at reasonable 
terms.90 The opposition also suggested the Conservatives purchased the elevators from 
their friends, benefiting them financially.91 The cost of maintaining the public elevator 
system was also much higher than the revenue, as the public system was only charging 
for the storage of wheat and was not making any money on the purchasing and selling of
89 Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, 139-40; Patton, Grain Growers' Cooperation, 
81-82; Wood, History o f  the Farm er’s Movement, 207-8.
90 Patton, Grain Growers' Cooperation, 89.
91 MacGibbon, ‘Grain Legislation Affecting Western Canada,’ 242.
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street grain. The public system proved disastrous and ended by August 1912.92 In order to 
maintain the elevator system, the GGGC agreed to lease the elevators. The GGGC used 
only 135 of the elevators the Manitoba government had acquired but, established a strong 
farmer elevator company. Within two years, the elevators had produced a profit of over
QT
four thousand dollars. The failure of the Manitoba government created concern among 
the farmers who had advocated state control of elevators.
The Saskatchewan government used a more reasoned approach, which led to the 
formation of the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company, Limited (SCEC). The 
Saskatchewan government convened a Royal Commission to investigate the elevator 
industry. The Commission recommended a system of co-operative elevators, which 
would receive financial aid from the government. The suggestions o f the Royal 
Commission were enacted in March 1911, and the government provided a loan of up to 
85 per cent for the cost of building each elevator. The government supported elevator 
construction in areas where a minimum amount of acreage signed up, and if farmers in 
the area provided the other 15 per cent of the funds needed. This approach saved both 
Saskatchewan and Alberta from the problems of state-owned elevators.94 After it was 
established, the SCEC undertook an elevator-building campaign, and arranged for the 
GGGC to act as its selling agent on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange.95 The SCEC and the 
GGGC also came to an agreement whereby the GGGC would not build an elevator where 
the Saskatchewan co-operative already had one in operation. This arrangement ensured
92 Ibid., 244; Patton, Grain Growers' Cooperation, 87-90, Wood, History o f  the Farmer's Movement, 211.
93 Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, 141; Grain Growers ’ Record, 16; Patton, Grain 
Growers' Cooperation, 95.
94 Boyle, ‘Agrarian Movement in the Northwest,’ 509; Fowke, ‘Royal Commissions and Canadian 
Agricultural Policy,’ 171; Wood, History o f  the Farm er’s Movement, 213.
95 Patton, Grain Growers’ Cooperation, 107-8.
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that the two farmers’ companies would not compete with each other and explained why 
the GGGC had a limited presence in Saskatchewan.96 Soon after the creation of the 
SCEC, the United Farmers o f Alberta petitioned the Alberta government to establish the 
Alberta Farmers’ Co-operative Elevator Company, along the same lines as the SCEC.97 
All three companies were soon making profits and expanding their capacity.98 Through 
the first decade of operation these elevator companies talked of amalgamating. By the 
end of 1917, the GGGC and the Alberta company formed the United Grain Growers 
Limited.99
By the end of the First World War, the United Grain Growers and the 
Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company had become the two largest companies 
operating on the Winnipeg Exchange, handling 20 to 25 per cent o f all western Canadian 
grain and controlling nearly 40 per cent o f the terminal elevator capacity at the 
Lakehead.100 The ideas of co-operation were not limited to the grain growers, and many 
other producers viewed the success of the Grain Growers’ companies with envy. 
Livestock producers urged the Alberta Co-operative and the GGGC to enter the livestock 
selling business, and these companies organized over forty livestock shipping co­
operatives.101 Farmers were very interested in supporting these co-operative enterprises. 
Farmers felt they could both save money initially and earn money through co-operative
96 Grain Growers' Record, 15.
97 Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 142; Wood, History o f  the Farm er’s Movement, 221.
98 The SCEC showed a profit of $52,461 in its first year and by the end o f its second year of operation, the 
number of elevators had increased from 46 to 137; Patton, Grain Growers ‘ Cooperation, 110. The Alberta 
company was able to make $565,000 in profits during its four years of independent operation; Wood, 
History o f the Farmer's Movement, 222. By 1912, the three co-operative companies owned over 20 per 
cent of the elevators in all the Prairie Provinces; Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada 41. In June 
1913, the GGGC purchased a terminal elevator at Fort William, equipped for cleaning and conditioning 
grain, and later built an elevator at Port Arthur, with a capacity o f 300,000 bushels, after fire destroyed the 
Fort William terminal; Grain Growers ’ Record, 16-17.
99 Grain Growers ’ Record, 25; Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, 508.
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enterprises. However, some farmers criticized companies such as the UGG for being too 
commercial and corporate in nature.102 
The Renewal in Ontario
As the number o f farmers in Canada increased and their importance in the 
national economy grew, they began to work together to demand more recognition from 
the Dominion and provincial governments, and play a more active in ensuring that the 
companies they created were able to protect the financial well-being of all farmers.
While farmers increased their power and influence on the Prairies, the Ontario farmers 
noticed their economic and social position was declining. Just as men formerly active in 
Ontario and in the United States had created the Western Canadian farmers movements, 
the success of the Grain Growers Associations inspired farmers in Ontario to renew their 
stagnant farmers’ movement.
After a trip to western Canada, J.J. Morrison a farmer from Ontario was inspired 
to create an organization like the Grain Growers Associations.103 Many people concerned 
about the farm movement realized it would be difficult to create a united organization 
similar to that o f the Prairies. Ontario farmers did not concentrate on one agricultural 
product like Western producers.104 Morrison met with other concerned individuals and, 
by March 1914, created two new organizations to represent Ontario farmers; the United 
Farmers o f Ontario (UFO) and the United Farmers’ Co-operative Company Limited
100 Patton, ‘The Canadian Grain P oo l,’ 167.
101 MacPherson, ‘The Co-operative Movements on the Prairies,’ 6.
102 Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 144-45.
103 Johnston, E.C. Drury, 39; Kechnie, ‘The United Farm Women o f Ontario,’ 268; Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  
Canadian Farm Organizations, 60; Wood, History o f the Farm er’s Movement, 274.
104 Johnston, E.C. Drury, 40.
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(UFCC).105 The UFO was focused on the concerns of Ontario farmers, specifically rural 
depopulation.106 By 1911, rural people were a minority in Ontario, and the proportion of 
rural to urban population was steadily decreasing.107 A common concern for many rural 
people was the belief that the urban and business classes dominated the economy, at the
1 OSexpense of the rural population. The UFCC was to do business in the interests of the 
farmers, according to co-operative principles, and reverse the economic decline farmers 
were experiencing.109 The Ontario farmers intended the UFCC to work for UFO members 
in the same way grain companies did for grain growers. In order to ensure good 
connections between the two groups, J.J. Morrison acted as secretary-treasurer of both 
the UFO and the UFCC.110 A number of co-operatives, of various forms, had existed in 
Ontario before the farmers created the UFCC and the new organization was to act as an 
umbrella organization for the different co-operatives.111
While connected through Morrison, the UFO and the UFCC developed on vastly 
divergent paths. The UFCC had a rough start, and the original directors were required to 
purchase additional stock in order to keep the company operating.112 Morrison attempted 
to capture the spirit o f discontent in the farm community to create support for the UFCC. 
He also hoped to use the UFO as a lobbying tool to improve the farmers’ economic
105 In October 1913, Morrison, E.C. Drury, Colonel J.Z. Frazer and W.C. Good met to discuss the future of 
the farmers’ movement, with Morrison expressing his hope that the remnants o f the Grange could come 
together with the government-sponsored farmers’ clubs to create a new organization; see Drury, Farmer 
Premier, 72-73.
106 The 1921 census shows that Ontario’s rural population had decreased by 100,000 between 1891 and 
1911 whereas in the same years, the urban population had increased by over 500,000; Tennyson, ‘The 
Ontario General Election o f 1919,’ 27.
107 In 1901, the rural to urban ratio was 57:43, by 1911 it was 48:52 and by 1921 it was 42:58; see Schull, 
Ontario Since 1867, 187.
108 MacDonald, The Happy Warrior, 233; Tennyson, ‘The Ontario General Election o f 1919,’ 28.
109 Kechnie, ‘The United Farm Women o f Ontario,’ 268.
110 Johnston, E.C. Drury, 42.
111 Badgley, ‘Co-operation Pays and Pays W ell,’ 166.
112 Johnston, E.C. Drury, 42.
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113situation in the province. Many farmers supported the co-operative idea in order to 
maximize their economic returns and strengthen the farmers’ cause.114 In 1915, the 
UFCC achieved some success and opened a selling company at the Toronto stockyards, 
allowing farmers to circumvent the livestock shipping monopoly to some extent.115
While the company was meeting with commercial success, there were problems. 
Differences in personality and management style caused considerable difficulties for the 
company. Morrison’s attempts through 1915 to increase his role in the UFCC and to 
centralize control o f the company concerned both E.C. Drury and W.C. Good, two other 
individuals who had helped create the UFO and the UFCC. However, Morrison’s 
popularity among the membership enabled him to maintain his position.116 In 1917, 
differences of opinion between Morrison and the new general manager, T.P. Loblaw, 
caused more problems. Loblaw pursued a more aggressive policy for the UFCC, 
including establishing a central warehouse and consolidating control of the member co-
* 117operatives. Morrison was opposed to this plan and forced Loblaw to resign. The 
UFCC experimented with different forms of co-operatives, including consumer co­
operatives and selling co-operatives, organized and controlled through contract. The 
Wanstead Farmers Club of Lambton Country experimented with selling hogs and 
required farmers to sign all o f their hogs over to the club. Those farmers that did not give 
the UFCC exclusive rights to sell their hogs were not allowed to ship anything through 
the club.118 Some local clubs moved away from requiring all members to sell by contract
113 Kechnie, ‘The United Farm Women of Ontario,’ 274.
114 Badgley, ‘Co-operation Pays and Pays W ell,’ 177.
115 Drury, Farmer Premier, 75
116 Johnston, E.C. Drury, 45-47.
117 Drury, Farmer Premier, 82-83; Loblaw later went on to found the successful chain of grocery stores 
bearing his name.
118 Badgley, ‘Co-operation Pays and Pays W ell,’ 175.
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and even allowed non-members to buy from the co-operative, but this removed the 
incentive to become a club member.119 The UFCC continued to expand during the 1920s, 
although the company faced financial difficulty caused by poor management and the 
depression of the early 1920s forced many stores to close.120 By 1925, the UFCC’s goal 
was obtaining the maximum return for the farmers’ dollar. The UFCC was no longer 
interested in the values of co-operation within the community. The abandonment of a co­
operative philosophy caused many members to withdraw their support from the 
company.121 The UFCC continued to operate, however, and undertook a number of 
different ventures including petroleum distribution, a co-operative insurance agency, and 
an apartment complex. It became the United Co-operative of Ontario in 1948. By this 
point, the UFCC established numerous co-operative ventures, including creameries and 
feed and fertilizer plants.122 The variety of ventures the UFCC/UCO undertook shows 
that, while it still supported co-operative ventures, it had moved away from primary 
support of the farm population.
The UFCC and other co-operative business ventures involved attempts by the 
farm population to challenge the governing business class that they saw as concerned 
principally with the urban population. Farmers hoped to use their new found financial 
power to change society. The quick growth of co-operatives provided evidence that 
Canadian farmers were able to accomplish considerable feats if  they worked together, but 
the proliferation of co-operatives undermined the position of co-operative leaders as they
119 Ibid, 176.
120 Ibid, 177; Good, Farmer Citizen, 236-38; Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 246.
121 Badgley, ‘Co-operation Pays and Pays Well,’ 179-80.
122 Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 247; The UCO helped establish the Co-operators 
Insurance Agency, and in the 1960s, even sponsored the founding of Twin Pines Apartments Ltd, an 
agency instrumental in providing low cost apartment dwellings for senior citizens in a number of Ontario 
centres.
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17^had too much to deal with. Many local co-operatives also tended to purchase buildings 
or establish businesses that were ill-suited to their localities and proved poor financial 
investments.124 The co-operative mentality played a large role in the moulding of 
Canadian agriculture but, during the First World War, a newfound desire to use their 
political power to change society filled the farm population.
The Farmers Enter Politics
While the UFCC had a bumpy career it continued to operate into the 1940s. In 
contrast, the UFO’s life is best described as a quick rise and equally swift decline. The 
development o f the UFO reflected the political protest that came to define the Canadian 
farmers’ movement before, during, and after the First World War. The UFO was born 
out of a desire to re-form the Ontario farmers’ movement. By February 1915, not even a 
year after its inception, the UFO had nearly two thousand members spread over thirty- 
four local clubs. The immediate concern of the UFO was the war effort, and how the war 
affected the position of farmers. Many members were worried urban factories and 
military service were drawing young farm men away from the countryside, further 
reducing the farm population.125 As the war effort continued, farmers became concerned 
about the possibility of conscription, especially the farm population. Farmers had long 
been concerned about the decline rural populations and felt conscription of the farm 
population would only further exasperate their inability to produce goods needed for the 
war effort, and to make a living.126 Across the country, farmers were conscious of their 
political power. Through the Canadian Council of Agriculture, farmers acted together to
123 MacPherson, ‘The Co-operative Movements on the Prairies,’ 7.
124 Badgley, ‘Co-operation Pays and Pays Well,’ 179.
125 Wood, History o f the Farmer’s Movement, 276.
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influence the political scene.127 This action included several mass meetings held in 
Ottawa to show how strong and united farmers were. The Canadian Council of 
Agriculture also developed a Farmers’ Platform in 1916. The platform acted as a guide 
for farmers in deciding which candidates they should vote for and lobby. It was 
described as the “New National Policy” and was designed to challenge the National 
Policy that had dominated Canadian politics since 1879, with its support of high 
manufacturing tariffs. The platform called for direct legislation, nationalization of 
communication tools, female suffrage, direct tax on unimproved land and natural 
resources, and a sharply graduated income tax.128
Disputes over how to deal with the political system divided the farmers’ 
movement. Some in the movement, such as Henry Wise Wood of Alberta, felt farmers 
should work within existing political parties. While others, such as T.A. Crerar of 
Manitoba, felt farmers should develop their own political group.129 In 1918, farmers 
became extremely upset with the Borden-led Unionist government when it reneged on its 
promise not to conscript farmers’ sons, a promise the Unionist government had made in 
order to gain the farmers vote.130 Canadian farmers viewed this as the final straw and 
turned against both the Conservative and Liberal parties.
126 W.R. Young, ‘Conscription, Rural Depopulation, and the Farmers of Ontario, 1917-19’ provides a 
detailed account o f these concerns.
127 The council was formed in 1909 to serve as an expression of the political and policy aspirations of 
farmers, specifically the desire to get rid o f the protective tariff. The members in the Canadian Council of 
Agriculture originally included the Grain Growers’ Associations, the UFA, the Grange and the Farmers’ 
Association o f  Ontario but other groups, including the UFO, the Interprovincial Council of Farm Women 
and United Farmers organizations from the Maritimes joined it later Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy, 
265; Good, Farmer Citizen, 87; Barry Wilson, Beyond the Harvest, 242, 298-302.
128 Schulz, Rise and Fall o f  Canadian Farm Organizations, 63-69; Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western 
Canada, 116; Wood, History o f the Farmer’s Movement, 346.
129 Wilson, Beyond the Harvest, 243.
130 Drury, Farmer Premier, 81; Good, Farmer Citizen, 103; Johnston, E.C. Drury, 51-52; Schull, Ontario 
Since 1867, 215; Wood, History o f  the Farmer’s Movement, 279.
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Precipitated by the Unionist government’s broken promise, the ‘agrarian revolt’ 
began in Ontario. Following two victories for farm candidates in provincial by-elections, 
Beniah Bowman of Manitoulin Island and John Widdifield of Ontario County, sixty-four 
candidates affiliated with, but not officially representing, the UFO stood for election in 
the 1919 Ontario general election.131 Ontario’s farmers were upset that members of the 
Legislative Assembly did not represent them, and farmers felt the lack of agrarian values 
in the Legislature Assembly degraded public morals.132 The election results surprised all 
of Canada, as farmer candidates won forty-five seats. Joined by candidates elected by the 
Independent Labour Party, the farmers formed a minority government under E.C. Drury 
with 55 members forming the government and 55 sitting in opposition.133 Emboldened by 
the formation of the Drury government in Ontario and angered by the Unionist 
government and the old parties, voters across Canada turned to support farmer 
candidates.134 The support for farmer candidates across the country showed that the 
agrarian movement was not confined to the Prairie West but existed wherever 
commercial agriculture had taken hold and wherever governments refused to consider the 
farmers’ role in society.135 With the notable exception of the UFA in Alberta and the
131 Drury, Farmer Premier, 83; Tennyson, ‘The Ontario General Election of 1919,’ 34.
1)2 Ibid., 27. Tennyson points out that before the 1919 election, only eighteen members o f  the 111 member 
Ontario legislature were farmers, although 70 per cent of the ridings were predominantly rural.
133 Considerable information is available on this government through Drury’s memoirs, Farmer Premier, as 
well as through the biography by Charles Johnston, E.C. Drury: Agrarian Idealist.
134 Despite only forming in April 1920, the United Farmers of Nova Scotia were able to elect eleven 
members to the legislature in a July 1920 vote; Rawlyk, ‘The Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of 
Socialism in Nova Scotia,’ 31-32. In 1921, the UFA formed a majority in the A lberta legislature. Rennie 
provides detailed information on the UFA’S entrance into direct politics and their victory in The Rise o f  
Agrarian Democracy. The United Farmers of Manitoba won the provincial election in 1920 and farmer 
candidates would gain substantial support in Saskatchewan in 1923; Tennyson, ‘The Ontario General 
Election of 1919,’ 58. The 1921 federal election saw farmer candidates win sixty-five seats, under the 
banner o f the UFA and the Progressives. This represented a large enough victory to ensure the Progressives 
could qualify as the official opposition; Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 206; Sharp, Agrarian 
Revolt in Western Canada, 151.
135 Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, 138.
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UFM in Manitoba, farmer parties soon lost voter support and the movements fell apart. 
The farmer candidates were attacked by some as being tools o f the Liberal party, and by 
others as serving specific class interests.136
Once in office, the farmer candidates in Ottawa and Toronto proved to be largely 
ineffective. The rank-and-file often disagreed with the actions o f the Members of 
Parliament.137 As few of the farmers’ candidates had held office before, they did not 
know how to exercise their power. 138 The Progressives refused to accept the position of 
Official Opposition. Many farmer MPs did not see themselves as members o f a party, but 
rather as representatives o f a new form of government and a transformation of society.139 
Individuals involved with the Progressives, declared the party system was dead and the 
only way to save society was to create a new system of class government, in which every 
economic group had representation and took responsibility for their actions.140 UFA 
representatives in the Dominion parliament declared that they had not been elected to 
support or oppose government, but to represent their constituents.141 As part of the 
farmer’s political philosophy included a rejection of the traditional party system, it was 
difficult for the Progressives to achieve any sort of unanimity and exercise an effective
136 The UFO in particular was targeted by the Ontario Orange order for being too oppositional to the 
traditional Protestant British character of Ontario; Pennefather, ‘Orange Order and the United Farmers of 
Ontario,’ 171-72; Wood, History o f  the Farmer's Movement, 352-54
137 Mackenzie King attempted to draw some Progressives into his cabinet, but the members o f the 
Progressive movement would not support any sort of coalition; Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, 
154. In his article, ‘The Better Sense of the Farm Population,’ Irwin argues that the Prairie farmers’ 
movement was split between those who wanted to overthrow the existing system o f politics and the 
economy and those who w ished to fix the existing system, and this split caused considerable difficulty 
within the farmers’ movements.
138 The Progressives exercised little actual political power and did not draw up any o f their own ideas. 
Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, 155-56. Drury’s government dealt with numerous problems, 
and as it only held power through a close balance between the coalition and the opposition force, it was 
forced to step back in instituting many of the policies from the Farmers’ Platform; as shown in Drury’s 
autobiography and in Johnston, E.C. Drury.
139 William Irvine, The Farmer in Politics, 86.
140 W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, 150.
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balance o f power.142 When the farmer candidates did not use power as the voters had 
hoped they would, they lost support and many farmers returned to the former parties, 
with most, but not all, o f the Progressives being absorbed into the Liberals.143 Those MPs 
that remained independent, ‘the Ginger Group’ hoped to continue to use their position as 
a tool for reform.144
The Farmer-Labour government in Ontario met with some success, introducing 
legislation and measures to provide some social safety nets. Drury’s government 
provided allowances to mothers with dependent children and a minimum wage act for 
women and girls.145 Drury and his Minister of Highways, Frank Campbell Biggs, 
improved the road and highway system in the province.146 To assist farmers, Manning W. 
Doherty, Minister o f Agriculture, established a series of banks, with government 
guarantees, that provided low interest loans for agricultural purposes.147 Relations 
between Drury’s government and the UFO became increasingly strained. Drury and 
Morrison had a public split over Drury’s plans to create a People’s Party with the
1 A o
farmers’ organization as a basis, a policy termed “Broadening Out”. Criticism from 
Morrison and others in the UFO significantly undermined farmer support for the 
government.149 While the government was able to maintain its coalition for four years, 
Drury’s government lost the 1923 election, thus marking the end of active political
141 Ibid., 151.
142 Ibid., 152.
143 Rawlyk, ‘The Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of Socialism in Nova Scotia,’ 36; Rennie, The 
Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 226-27.
144 Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, 157. Many members o f this Ginger Group would form 
the embryo for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.
145 Drury, Farmer Premier, 108.
146 Ibid., 115.
147 Wood, History o f  the Farm er’s Movement in Canada, 333.
148 Ibid., 283.
149 Johnston, E.C. Drury, 127-32.
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participation for farm organizations in Ontario, and the membership in UFO clubs 
dropped dramatically.'50 The failure of the Drury government disillusioned Ontario 
farmers to such an extent that the December 1923 annual meeting of the UFO passed a 
resolution stating that political activities had seriously eroded the social, educational, and 
economic features o f the Ontario farm movement.151
The experience of the farmer in politics reflected a pattern set by the Patrons of 
Industry. The results of the 1919-1923 Drury government were similar to earlier Patrons’ 
experiments, and farmers concluded that they should not seek political power again. 
Farmers realized they did not have enough power to challenge the hold the business 
classes had on government. The rank-and-file of farmers’ organizations often viewed 
attempts to bring others into the Farmer-Labour government as contrary to party goals, 
and believed that farmer parties would become just as corrupt and unfaithful to its 
principles as traditional political parties. As it became apparent that the farmer 
candidates were not able to change “the system”, farm organizations began to focus on 
economic ideas, specifically controlling markets, in order to improve their position in 
society. The patterns established by these farm organizations would eventually provide 
the hog farmers of Ontario with a base upon which to build their organization.
150 Johnston, E.C. Drury, 194; Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 86.
151 Johnston, E.C. Drury, 208.
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Chapter Three: Towards Control of Marketing
Having failed in politics, farmers turned to economic organizations in an effort to 
work with the market and to make the market work for them. Across the country, 
farmers worked to establish marketing boards, such as the Wheat Board, and eventually 
the Hog Board in Ontario. Farmers felt, if they were united, they would represent a 
strong economic force and be able to influence the market. During the 1920s, various 
voluntary and contract commodity pools were formed. These pools lacked the authority 
to force producers to sell through them, and were unable to achieve enough market 
power. Despite this, some pools achieved significant success, including the prairie 
Wheat Pools. In 1927, the government of British Columbia passed marketing legislation 
that set a pattern for other provinces to follow. A series of legal challenges forced the 
Dominion Parliament to pass a Natural Products Marketing Act in 1934, allowing 
farmers across the country to create marketing boards. Ontario passed its own marketing 
legislation, the Ontario Farm Products Control Act, in 1940, allowing for the creation of 
marketing boards in that province. The marketing boards took various forms, with 
varying degrees of power over commodities.
The success of the Grain Growers’ Grain Company and the Saskatchewan Co­
operative Elevator Company strengthened the Canadian farmers’ faith in co-operative 
activities. Co-operative purchasing groups were widely supported and, while not as 
popular, co-operative marketing of agricultural goods had been taking place for decades. 
The major problem for these endeavours was the voluntary nature of the co-operatives. If 
farmers were not required to sell all of their goods through the co-operative, some 
producers, thinking they could receive a better price for their goods outside of the co­
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operative, would do so. This created a difficulty for the co-operatives; if  the manager of 
the pool did not know the amount of a specific commodity he had to sell, he had 
difficulty negotiating a price.1 The co-operative selling groups, working with a number 
o f different commodities were often too diverse and prevented the selling-groups from 
representing specific producers effectively. Even before 1920, the make-up of selling co­
operatives began to change.
The conditions o f the First World War introduced Canadian grain farmers to a 
controlled market. In order to assist the war effort, the Canadian government through an 
Order-in Council established the Board of Grain Supervisors. The government gave this 
Board control over Canadian wheat for the 1916 and 1917 wheat crops, and set the price 
of wheat based on several variables including, the point of origin, the quality of the grain, 
and the cost of transporting it.2 While the farmers had no role in creating this 
organization, the government’s wartime control o f the wheat market was a major factor in 
leading farmers to support a more activist state. The price set by the Board of Grain 
Supervisors, which farmers initially felt was too low, provided predictability and farmers 
began to ask for set prices for other commodities, such as hogs.3 After the war ended, in 
order to combat sharp increases in prices and following a brief period o f open trading 
between 21 July and 31 July 1919 during which the price of wheat shot up, the Unionist 
government established a Canadian Wheat Board to market the remainder o f the 1918
1 Badgley, ‘Co-operation Pays and Pays W ell,’ 175; Larsen and Erdman, ‘Aaron Sapiro: Genius of Farm 
Co-operative Promotion,’ 266.
2 Fowke, ‘Dominion Aids to Wheat Marketing, 1929-39,’ 390; Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat 
Economy,’ 169; Grain Growers’ Record, 24; Patton, The Canadian Grain Pool, 168.
3 Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 123.
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and 1919 crops. The government’s quick action to cap prices did not impress producers, 
as the government had never worked so fast to prevent price falls.4
Unlike the Board of Grain Supervisors, the Wheat Board did not buy at a fixed 
price but provided initial payment and distributed interim and final payments as the crop 
was sold. Farmers could deliver wheat at any time and expect to receive the same 
amount for their wheat, in contrast to selling on the open market, where the appearance of 
more wheat caused prices to drop. The stability provided by the Wheat Board impressed 
many farmers.5 On 18 August 1920, when the government reinstated the Winnipeg Grain 
Exchange, the price o f wheat dropped dramatically, opening at $2.73 per bushel, then 
dropping to $2.07 by 18 November 1920, and falling as low as $1.11 by November 
1921.6 Believing the reintroduction of the free market, and not other economic factors, 
had caused wheat prices to drop, farmers looked back longingly on the controlled 
economy established by the Board of Grain Supervisors and the Wheat Board.7
Responding to the demands of prairie farmers, Progressive Members of 
Parliament called for the re-establishment o f the Wheat Board, citing it as an unqualified 
success.8 Members o f the Conservative opposition, however, warned that in order for the 
government to provide a wheat board, it would have to establish too much control over
4 Davisson, Pooling Wheat In Canada, 1; Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 12; Fowke, ‘The National Policy 
and the Wheat Economy,’ 171; MacPherson, ‘Missionaries of Rural Development,’ 74; Patton, Grain 
Growers Cooperation in Western Canada, 196-7.
5 Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada, 196-7.
6 Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 13; Fowke, ‘The National Policy and the W heat Economy,’ 177; Rennie, 
The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 153-5
7 Patton, Grain Growers’ Cooperation in Western Canada, 199-200.
8 On March 15, 1922, Robert Johnson, MP for Moosejaw, (Progressive) stated that the Wheat Board was an 
unqualified success; Canada, Parliament, Flouse of Commons, Official Report o f Debates, 15 March 1922, 
115. On 16 March 1922 Donald Kennedy, MP for West Edmonton (Progressive) also demanded the re­
establishment o f the wheat board; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report o f Debates, 16 
March 1922, 146.
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other aspects o f the economy, including railway companies.9 Leader of the Conservative 
opposition Arthur Meighen warned the re-establishment of a compulsory board would 
involve the government in a quagmire.10 Suggestions to establish a voluntary pool met 
with opposition as some representatives felt that a voluntary pool would not be sufficient 
to overcome the economic conditions that “have existed during the past three or four 
hundred years.”11 Farmer representatives suggested the government take the opportunity 
presented by the post-war era and recommended it was “ .. .time for us [parliament] to 
come forward with a scheme that has provided itself satisfactory to the men who grow 
grain.. i.e., the compulsory wheat board.12 As the representative o f organized farmers, 
the Canadian Council of Agriculture called for the re-establishment of the Wheat Board.
In response to these demands, W.L. Mackenzie King’s Liberal government 
established a special committee to hear testimony for and against the board.13 The 
committee eventually recommended the government establish a national wheat marketing 
agency to sell the 1922 wheat crop. On 19 June 1922, a motion to this effect was tabled 
in the Dominion Parliament.14 The resulting bill reflected similar legislation implemented 
in Australia, and stated it would not come into effect unless it was agreed to by two of the 
three Prairie Provinces.15 While the bill was passed in the House of Commons, 
Manitoba’s Progressive Premier John Bracken did not support the compulsory wheat 
board. Bracken felt that Manitoba farmers generally received better rates anyway, and the
9 William Maclean, an Independent Conservative representative for York expressed this concern on 14 
March 1922, Canada, Parliament, House o f  Commons, Official Report o f Debates, 14 March 1922, 72.
10 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 14 June 1922, 2919.
11 On March 16, 1922, Progressive Arthur John Lewis, MP for Swift Current, expressed these sentiments; 
Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, Official Report of Debates, 16 March 1922, 152.
12 Ibid.
13 Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, Official Report of Debates, 14 June 1922, 2915.
14 Ibid, 3174.
15 Ibid, 3175, 3382,3387.
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Manitoba legislature defeated the legislation by a vote of 24 to 21. Saskatchewan and 
Alberta initially supported the legislation but without Manitoba’s support, the Premiers of 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, Liberal Charles Avery Dunning and the UFA’s Herbert 
Greenfield respectively, announced they would not support the plan.16 The opposition of 
all three Prairie Provinces forced Members of Parliament to call for the reconstitution of 
the Wheat Board under Dominion control, to allow the Board to operate under the logical 
control o f one government and to prevent ineffective control by several governments.17 
The Story o f  the Pools
The failure o f the farmers’ political movement led a new group of younger and 
more radical farmers to challenge the system and call for more orderly marketing.
Orderly marketing was understood by those involved in the pool to be the even 
distribution of selling of wheat, over time, as opposed to dumping most of the wheat crop 
on the market within a short period. It has since come to be understood as any form of 
controlled marketing, utilized in order to achieve the best prices for the producers, or 
efforts to improve the overall quality and demand for a product.18 Believing the 
government would not re-establish such a national wheat board, farm leaders began to 
campaign for their own organization. The Canadian Council of Agriculture began to 
discuss the idea of a wheat pool, based on pooling ideas popular at the time.19 Due to the 
work of Aaron Sapiro, a California lawyer, the organization of selling co-operatives 
began to change. Sapiro did not necessarily develop new ideas for co-operatives, but
16 Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 14-15.
17 John Baxter, Conservative MP for St. John City and the Counties of St. John and Albert expressed this 
sentiment in the 1923 parliament; Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, Official Report of Debates, 
1923,2592.
18 MacPherson, ‘Missionaries of Rural Development,5 75; Fowke, ‘The National Policy and the Wheat 
Economy,’ 223. MacPherson, ‘An Authoritative Voice,’ 166.
19 Rennie, The Rise o f  Agrarian Democracy, 155.
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instead organized pre-existing ideas in an easy to understand manner. He also worked 
tirelessly to present these ideas to farmers.20 Sapiro encouraged co-operatives to focus on 
specific commodities, in the belief that this allowed the co-operatives to meet the 
differing needs of each commodity group. Such focused co-operatives also allowed the 
groups to control the supply of products and achieve greater influence on the market 
conditions that set the price of goods. The belief that co-operatives needed to control a 
substantial volume of the product led Sapiro to encourage co-operative associations to 
require contracts with sellers and only do business with farmers who had signed
9 ]contracts. Contrary to the opinions expressed by others in the agricultural community, 
Sapiro felt pools could organize any type of commodity.22 Sapiro also did not think co­
operatives should rely on litigation to control goods or members.23 This belief 
contradicted the work farm organizers later undertook. Sapiro stressed self-help and self- 
reliance for farmers, which had been popular among leaders of the pre-World War I co­
operative institutions.24 By 1922 Sapiro had organized over fifty-five co-operatives in 
nineteen states.25 Following his successful work in the United States, and due to the 
desire o f various Canadian farm organizations to develop a similar method of marketing 
wheat, these groups brought Sapiro to Canada. Support for the pool idea began to grow.26
20 Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 17; Larsen and Erdman. ‘Aaron Sapiro: Genius o f Farm Co-operative 
Promotion,’ 251.
21 Davisson, Pooling Wheat In Canada, 116; Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 23; Larsen and Erdman,
‘Aaron Sapiro: Genius o f  Farm Co-operative Promotion,’ 247-52.
22 Davisson, Pooling Wheat In Canada, 117.
23 Ibid, 120.
24 MacPherson, ‘Missionaries of Rural Development,’ 77.
25 Larsen and Erdman, ‘Aaron Sapiro: Genius o f  Farm Co-operative Promotion,’ 257.
26 In 1922, Ontario Minister of Agriculture Manning Doherty brought Sapiro to Ontario to help organize 
dairymen; Badgley, ‘Co-operation Pays and Pays Well,’ 169. The Farmers Union o f Canada, a 
Saskatchewan based organization invited Aaron Sapiro to address its first convention on 2 July 1923, while 
the Calgary Herald and Edmonton Journal pushed for the organization of a speaking tour by Sapiro; 
Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 20-22; Davisson, Pooling Wheat In Canada, 21; MacPherson, ‘Co­
operative Movements on the Prairies,’ 9
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Support for the pool was premised on the belief that the major problem in the
marketing of wheat was the farmers rush to sell their crops as soon as they were
harvested. Cash poor farmers needed to pay the bills, especially the bank loans that had
piled up through the year.27 When all the farmers were trying to sell their crop at once,
buyers paid less for the grain. If the farmers pooled their crops, sold them bit by bit, and
were provided with money through a series of payments, producers would receive more
money for their product and not be cash strapped at harvest time.28 Organizers in Alberta
signed up nearly 50 per cent of the province’s acreage, so that by 29 October 1923, when
the Alberta Pool began operations, it marketed approximately 35,000,000 bushels in one
year.29 In 1924, after some difficulty, but with considerable support from the SCEC, the
UGG, and the provincial governments, farmers’ organizations in Saskatchewan and 
• « mManitoba also organized successful wheat pools. However, Ontario’s attempt to 
organize a pool was not as successful. It began in 1927, but was unable to sell its grain at 
a high enough price to cover the advance payments to its members. The Ontario wheat 
pool ended operations by 1931, largely due to the minor importance of wheat in the 
agricultural economy of the province.31
27 Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 25.
28 This was an idea that had been proposed by E.A. Partridge as early as 1907, and which would be utilized 
by post-1935 version o f the Wheat Board; See Irwin,‘The Better Sense o f the Farm Population,’ 39.
29 Davisson, Pooling Wheat In Canada, 21
30 The Saskatchewan Co-operative Wheat Producers incorporated under the Saskatchewan Companies Act 
on 25 August 1923, and launched a campaign to sign up as much wheat acreage as possible, but by 13 
September 1923, only 29 per cent of the province’s total wheat acreage was signed up through contracts. 
Efforts in 1924 fared better and by 26 June 1924, 50 per cent of the Saskatchewan crop was signed to the 
pool, with the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool becoming operational on that day. The Manitoba pool only had 
contracts for 30 per cent of that province’s wheat by 1 April 1924, but the pool organizers decided to 
operate with the pool anyway; Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 27-40; Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation 
in Western Canada, 220.
31 Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 246; Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation in Western 
Canada, 254.
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The pools in Western Canada joined together and organized a central selling 
agency, the Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producers Ltd., which began operations on 29
"39July 1924. The success of these pools inspired producers of other agricultural 
commodities, such as livestock, to consider marketing their commodities along the same 
lines as the wheat pools.33 The Saskatchewan Pool expanded quickly and in 1926 
purchased the elevator system of the SCEC, which included nearly one-quarter of the 
terminal elevator capacity at the Lakehead. Relations between the UGG and the 
Saskatchewan pool suffered. The UGG and the Saskatchewan Pool disagreed over which 
company should control the elevators in Saskatchewan. The leaders o f the Saskatchewan 
pools also questioned whether the UGG was actually a co-operative. The UGG agreed to 
work with the Alberta pool to handle the wheat at cost.34
Despite the success of the wheat pools, and favourable legal decisions, there was 
some difficulty in ensuring that farmers adhered to their contracts. The Saskatchewan 
Pool, while having nearly 72 per cent of the province’s wheat on contract, only handled 
between 56 and 58 per cent of the wheat crop from 1925 to 1928. A 1926 court case 
against Leon R. Zurowski confirmed the legality of the pool contract and allowed the 
pool to charge a twenty-five cent penalty for every bushel a contract holder sold outside 
of the pool. The wheat pools continued to expand and established a coarse grain pool in 
1925.35 While the wheat pools were successful co-operative organizations, a number of 
farmers, and a number of farmer representatives in Parliament, continued to advocate re­
32 Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 42.
33 Grain Growers' Record, 55.
34 Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 67-8; Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada, 236-40.
35 Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 68-70.
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establishing the Wheat Board.36 By the time the prairie wheat pools were entering their 
second five-year contract period in 1928-29, they had a combined membership of 
140,000 or approximately three-fifths of the wheat growers in the Prairie provinces.37 
Through these contracts, the wheat pools controlled one-fifth of the wheat on the 
international market, but the pools did not have influence on the international market 
proportional to their share of wheat being marketed.38 Farming conditions across the 
prairies improved from 1925 to 1929 however, and the pools were able to influence the 
Winnipeg Grain Exchange, bringing their prices into line with those on the world market. 
In Parliament, various MPs lauded the pools for the success that the western farmers 
achieved through the 1920s.39
Although less than two-thirds of all wheat farmers signed contracts, the pools 
were still able to benefit both their members and non-member farmers.40 This situation 
caused tension and, after the establishment of the wheat pool, organizers launched a 
campaign to achieve legislation giving the pools the power to market all wheat. This 
campaign, inspired by Sapiro’s 1927 visit to Saskatchewan and led by the United Farmers
36 Alfred Speakman, MP for Red Deer, o f the United Farmers of Alberta suggested this but Meighen 
suggested that such action was unnecessary as the pools were already working to protect farmers; Canada, 
Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 1925, 980. Members o f the Progressive Party, 
including Oliver Gould, MP for Assiniboia, discussed the benefits of that party’s platform, including re­
establishment o f the Wheat Board; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 
1925,2378.
37 Patton, ‘The Market Influence o f the Canadian Wheat Pool,’ 211.
38 Ibid., 212; MacPherson, ‘An Authoritative Voice,’ 166.
39 A great number o f MPs expressed these sentiments and used the wheat pools to celebrate co-operative 
ideals and the hard work and faith o f farmers, including Liberal Frederick Gershaw MP of Medicine Hat, 
Progressive Donald Kennedy, MP for Peace River, Liberal George Spence, MP for Maple Creek and 
Liberal Thomas Donnelly, MP for Willow Bunch; Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, Official 
Report of Debates, 1926, 368, 532, 2679, 3197. Liberal William Bock, MP for Maple Creek, went so far as 
to suggest that, while farmers faced many problems due to weather and other factors, the situation would 
have been much worse if  it had not been for the wheat pool. Bock also suggested that while the wheat pool 
increased prices received for wheat by the farmers, it did not increase the cost of bread for the consumers. 
Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, Official Report of Debates, 1928, 173.
40 MacPherson, ‘An Authoritative Voice,’ 165; Patton, ‘The Market Influence o f the Canadian Wheat 
Pool,’ 213.
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of Canada (Saskatchewan Section) (UFC (SS)), sought legislation to force every farmer 
to deliver wheat to the pool. However, the campaign did not have the support o f every 
pool member 41 Contemporary commentators argued the idea of compulsory pooling 
poised a real danger to the pools because it threatened to tear the organizations apart. As 
a result, some pool members and leaders supported it, while others did not.42 
Nevertheless, the compulsory pooling campaign received support from many farm 
organizations, and it became the focus of farmers to such an extent that most farmers 
were not interested in political involvement. Farmers feared political involvement would 
divide the 100 per cent campaign. They also feared that too close a connection to one 
particular party might discredit the farmers’ goals 43 Early in 1931, legislation from 
Conservative Premier Anderson of Saskatchewan and the Saskatchewan Legislature 
provided hope for the compulsory pooling campaign, but a court decision declared the 
legislation to be ultra vires, as it would reduce inter-provincial trade, thus destroying the 
dreams of the UFC (SS) and others regarding compulsory pooling. Further appeals by 
the UFC (SS) to the Saskatchewan government failed, and the campaign for compulsory 
pooling died in July 1931.44 This failure highlighted the fact that marketing legislation at 
the time exceeded the constitutional powers of the provincial governments.
41 While the United Farmers o f Canada (Saskatchewan Section) supported the idea o f compulsory pooling, 
delegates to several consecutive annual pool meetings rejected the idea, with the 1929 meeting voting 
against compulsion 120 to 25; Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 76-77
42 Patton, ‘The Canadian Grain Pool,’ 178.
43 Davisson, Pooling Wheat In Canada, 233; Griezic, ‘Introduction,’ in Wood, xv; Hoffman, ‘The Entry of 
the United Farmers of Canada, Saskatchewan Section in Politics,’ 101-2; Wilson, Beyond the Harvest, 244.
44 On 30 December 1930, Premier Anderson promised compulsory legislation if the majority of the 
farmers in the province supported the plan, and the Referendum and Grain Marketing Bill was given royal 
assent to on 11 March 1931. By 27 April 1931 the bill had been brought before the Saskatchewan Court o f 
Appeal and four judges handed down separate written judgments declaring the legislation to be beyond the 
power o f the provincial Legislature; Fowke, ‘The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,’ 241-42.
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The system of offering initial payments, while useful in providing financial 
stability for the farmer, caused significant financial hardships for the pools when the 
Great Depression descended upon Canada. The wheat pools, like so many other 
businesses, were gripped in the economic downturn. In 1929, the pools offered members 
high initial payments in order to ensure their continued support for the pools. These high 
initial payments proved to be excessive as wheat prices dropped dramatically. When 
pools sold the crop, they lost nearly $75 million.45 As the Depression deepened, a fierce 
debate arose in the Dominion Parliament about whether the wheat pools, by withholding 
wheat from the market, were causing the financial difficulties of the West.46 Others felt 
the wheat pools were the only thing standing between farmers and complete financial 
ruin.47 As prices continued to drop, the pool leaders realized the organization could not 
operate under such low price conditions. The pool released its members from their 
contracts in June 1931 and the pool continued on a voluntary basis.48
45 Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots, 93
46 On 24 February 1930, Leader o f the Conservative Opposition R.B. Bennett suggested this, blaming the 
government for continuing to support the wheat pool which led to many farmers losing money; Canada, 
Parliament, House o f Commons, Official Report o f Debates, 24 February 1930, 20. On the same day, 
Progressive Robert Gardnier, MP for Acadia, Alberta doubted the government’s optimism and the 
statements o f  the pools regarding the quality o f their wheat. Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, 
Official Report o f Debates, 24 February 1930, 49. On 14 May 1930 Liberal Alfred Bourgeois, MP for 
Kent, New Brunswick, stated that, by withholding the export of wheat, the pools hurt not only the farmers, 
but also the railway system; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 14 May 
1930,2106-7.
47 On 14 May 1930 Kennedy o f the UFA, MP for Peace River stated that only co-operation could put 
agriculture on a stable basis and even expressed hope that the government would support a livestock pool 
similar to the wheat pool. Kennedy suggested that Denmark provided example o f how co-operation could 
move farmers from a state o f near poverty to a state o f financial independence and that the wheat pool, far 
from causing the conditions in the west, prevented them from being worse; Canada, Parliament, House of 
Commons, Official Report of Debates, 14 May 1930, 2084. J.S. Woodsworth, Labour MP for Winnipeg 
North Centre, argued that there were many factors causing the drop in wheat prices, and that the wheat pool 
was the only thing standing between farmers and complete ruin; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, 
Official Report of Debates, 18 September 1930, 400; Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, Official 
Report of Debates, 17 March 1931,74.
48 Patton, ‘Observations on Canadian Wheat Policy Since the World War,’ 222-23.
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In order to save prairie farmers and the pools from financial ruin, the Bennett 
Conservative government replaced the Wheat Pools with a federal stabilization 
organization in 1931. The Dominion government took control o f the wheat held by the 
pool and settled the claims of the banks against the Wheat Pool.49 The pools did not shut 
down and die as they continued to operate the co-operative elevator companies.50 
Following the liquidation of wheat stocks, the Dominion government revealed wheat 
pools had overpaid farmers more than twenty-two million dollars for the 1928 and 1929 
crops. With the failure o f the wheat pools, it appeared the idea o f a pool based on non- 
compulsory involvement was dead, and pool officials renewed the campaign for re­
establishment o f the national wheat board.51 In 1932, Conservative Minister of 
Agriculture Robert Weir suggested, in order to keep the price o f agricultural products 
higher than the world price, the government should adopt a natural products marketing 
act.52 Farmers continued to urge the Bennett government to establish a national wheat 
board, an appeal to which the Bennett government assented in July 1935 when a non- 
compulsory Canadian Wheat Board was established.53 The Conservative government 
created the Board not as a co-operative, but as an arm of the government designed to 
dispose o f the wheat stocks the co-operative wheat pools had built up.54 The Bennett 
government yielded to the campaign for a national Wheat Board because it faced a
49 Fowke, ‘The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,’ 181; Grain Growers Record, 37.
50 Fowke, ‘The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,’ 196.
51 Ibid, 251-2.
32 Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, Official Report o f Debates, 10 May 1932, 2795.
53 Fowke, ‘The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,’, 262. The federal government did not introduce 
the wheat board’s monopoly control until 1943, and it was not intended to prevent a drop in wheat prices, 
but instead was in answer to the war, as the federal government hoped to ensure the availability of wheat 
supplies and prevent a sharp increase in prices. Between its creation and the granting o f monopoly powers, 
the board continued to exist as an alternative for farmers to selling their wheat on the open market. Ibid., 
181,276.
54 Drummond, ‘Marketing Boards in the White Dominions,’ 202
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general election and a new party, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.55 Farmers 
flocked to the Wheat Board and the Board handled approximately 70 per cent of the 
marketed wheat in 1935. After the first year of operation, however, the Canadian Wheat 
Board announced it would only take deliveries from farmers if the price of wheat fell 
below ninety cents per bushel. Despite the difficulties and turbulence o f the Great 
Depression, for every year but 1934-35, Canada maintained its position as the world’s 
leading exporter of wheat.56 By the beginning of the Great Depression, it was clear a non- 
compulsory pool was ineffective and, while the government stepped in to help the 
producers, this was largely due to the importance of the wheat crop to the Canadian 
economy, even in the depths o f the Great Depression. After the pool experiment 
collapsed, prairie farmers looked to stronger organizations.
Developing Marketing Boards
Farmers in other parts of Canada and other countries, however, had realized the 
weaknesses of co-operatives earlier and worked to develop producer boards. They 
recognized the need to control the entire crop of a commodity. In Britain, the 
government supported marketing boards such as the Empire Marketing Board. The 
Empire Marketing Board was created in 1924 to help the farmers and re-establish 
agriculture in Britain, through spending money on advertising and research into ways of 
increasing the British market for goods produced in the Commonwealth.57 Unlike 
previous attempts by government to support agriculture, this board focused on increasing 
the market share not just increasing production. While Canadian farmers relied on
55 Fowke, ‘The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,’ 263.
56 Patton, ‘Observations on Canadian Wheat Policy Since the World War,’ 218, 224-26.
57 Drummond, ‘Marketing Boards in the White Dominions,’ 195-96.
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producer co-operatives, in Britain control and marketing boards were substituted.58 
Australia was the first Dominion to pass laws authorizing producer marketing boards, in 
the form of the Queensland Wheat Pool Act of 1920 and the Queensland Primary 
Producers Act o f 1922. The essential feature of these acts was that, when the majority of 
the producers of a particular commodity wanted to sell their products collectively, the law 
compelled the minority to join in a common sales policy.59 These acts represented a 
major change in agricultural organization, as the proportion o f individual producers 
signing up did not determine the strength o f farmers’ economic organizations.
Canadian attempts to establish marketing legislation and boards originated in 
British Columbia. Dairy and fruit producers developed co-operatives to control 
production, purchase supplies, and lobby governments. One co-operative, organizing the 
fruit farmers in the Okanagan Valley, developed a selling organization in 1913 and began 
to require its members to sign contracts in 1923. In its first year, the co-operative 
controlled 85 per cent of the fruit crop in the Okanagan Valley and was able to obtain 
better prices for their fruit. Like the wheat pools, the co-operatives benefited both 
members and non-members, because non-members received the same benefits without 
potential sacrifice or cost.60 As this became apparent, members began to break their 
contracts with the co-op. In response, co-operative leaders began lobbying for marketing 
legislation.61 Dairy farmers and fruit growers accumulated enough social and political
58 Ibid., 196.
59 Royal Commission on Price Spreads o f Food Products -  The Role of Marketing Boards in Canadian 
Food Marketing, 19 May 1959, 5; Flistory Objectives Marketing Methods of the OHPA, Marketing Board 
and Co-operatives plus some observations on the economics of Ontario’s Hog Industry; Information 
Department, OFA, January 1958 Archival and Special Collections, University of Guelph Library, Wilfred 
L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Folder: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plans, 1956-68.
60 Royal Commission on Price Spreads o f Food Products -  The Role of Co-operatives in Canadian Food 
Marketing, May 1959, 61.
61 W.M. Drummond, ‘The Role of Agricultural Marketing Boards,’ 247.
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support to force the provincial government to introduce legislation providing for orderly
A')
marketing boards. In 1927, the BC Legislative Assembly passed the Produce and 
Marketing Act, allowing the establishment of a committee to regulate the time and place 
o f marketing, the quantity and quality of a marketed product, to set prices, and to collect 
a levy to cover the operating costs of the committee.63
The passing of BC’s marketing legislation was a major step forward for farmer’s 
co-operatives, but it did not last. In 1931, the Supreme Court of Canada declared the 
legislation invalid, stating it exceeded provincial power as it interfered with inter­
provincial trade.64 To be effective, Canadian marketing boards would need to influence, 
not just their province, but also inter-provincial trade. Constitutionally, provincial 
governments did not have the authority to grant this power.65 After the Supreme Court 
declared the BC legislation ultra vires, farmers across the country began to advocate for 
marketing boards and the creation of a national marketing programme. While farmers 
preferred provincial boards, they recognized the Dominion Parliament would have to pass 
enabling legislation.66
As early as 1932, the Bennett government discussed the passage of marketing 
legislation to increase the price of agricultural products. Two 1932 court cases suggested 
the Dominion government might be able to create a country-wide framework for 
producer marketing boards, and these cases initiated the discussion to establish such
62 MacPherson, ‘Some Fortune and a Little Fame,’ 40.
63 W.M. Drummond, ‘The Role of Agricultural Marketing Boards,’ 247.
64 Norris, Hopper and Mack, ‘The Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934,’ 466; W.M Drummond, ‘The 
Role of Agricultural Marketing Boards,’ 247.
65 Ian Drummond, ‘Marketing Boards in White Dominions,’ 201.
66 Barber, Conservative MP for the Fraser Valley expressed these concerns in January 1934, stating that the 
break down o f co-operative marketing in BC was causing problems for the fruit and dairy industry.
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 29 January 1934, 16.
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legislation.67 While the Bennett government stated it supported such legislation, other 
MPs worried it would only cause more problems for farmers because it would further 
clog the wheels o f marketing.68 The first motion presented by the Conservatives 
supporting the establishment o f a marketing board appeared in 193 3.69 Even with this bill 
on the table, MPs continued to advocate for the re-creation of the Wheat Board.70 
Farmers saw progress in 1934 when the Bennett government passed the Natural Products 
Marketing Act, which authorized marketing schemes, but only if the principal market of 
the natural product was located outside the province of production.71 With the passage of 
this bill, Canada joined thirty-seven other nations that had passed legislation designed to 
allow collective bargaining by primary producers.72
When the Conservative government presented the bill in Parliament, members 
from across the country expressed their concerns, stating it would produce too many 
over-lapping boards, and the boards would limit the freedom of producers, including
• » • 77 •implementing production caps. Others, while supporting the idea of a wheat board, 
feared marketing boards would not be as successful as the pools had been and questioned 
the necessity or advisability of one hundred per cent control, stating this control would 
not have saved the wheat pools.74 Much of the Liberal opposition was likely a political 
strategy designed to oppose the current government, and not necessarily premised on the 
belief that the marketing legislation would lead to the downfall o f society. Agriculture
67 Ian Drummond, ‘Marketing Boards in White Dominions,’ 202.
68 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 18 May 1932, 3048-49.
69 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, October 1932 -  May 1933, 1553.
70 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report o f Debates, 26 February 1934, 930.
71 Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, Official Report of Debates, 26 March 1934, 1813; Norris et al, 
‘The Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934,’ 466.
72 Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 145.
73 Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, Official Report of Debates, 16 April 1934, 2206, 2210.
74 Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, Official Report of Debates, 17 April 1934, 2265.
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Minister Weir advised Parliament he had received assurances from several provinces of 
their desire to pass concurrent legislation. A number of farm groups across the country 
also supported Weir.75 Several court challenges followed the passage of the act, which 
gave the Dominion Marketing Board and its local boards the authority, through 
marketing schemes, to protect the products of one province against the products of 
another province.76
Following these court decisions, a number of new marketing boards appeared, 
representing a variety o f commodity producers in different regions of Canada.77 The 
majority o f these schemes focused on produce such as vegetables, although there was 
consideration of establishing marketing boards to regulate the marketing o f cattle, sheep, 
and swine in the three Prairie Provinces, and to regulate the marketing of cattle exported
7 0
from Canada. The Royal Commission on Price Spreads supported the idea of controlled 
marketing in 1935, to undo the significant damage done to the primary producer by the 
Depression. The Commission concluded “ .. .the primary producer has borne the brunt of
73 Canada, Parliament, House o f Commons, Official Report of Debates, 17 April 1934, 2253-55.
76 Norris et al, ‘The Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934,’ 472.
77 Included in the schemes that were developed within a year of the Natural Products Marketing Act were: 
the British Columbia Tree Fruit Scheme, coming into affect on 28 August 1934; the Fruit Export Marketing 
Scheme, 8 September 1934, specifically concerned with improving the market for Canadian fruit in the 
United Kingdom; the British Columbia Red Cedar Shingle Export Scheme, 16 October 1934, focused on 
regulating exports o f  red shingles produced in BC to the US so each producer could obtain a fair share of 
the export trade; British Columbia Dry Salt Herring and Dry Salt Salmon Scheme, 22 October 1934, giving 
power to regulate time and place of marketing, to create a pool, and to require licenses for all packers and 
shippers, with the hope of raising prices, stabilizing the market and increasing marketing for products in 
Asia; Ontario Flue-cured Tobacco Scheme, 26 October 1934, which wanted to ensure more adequate 
returns to the producers; Eastern Canada Potato Marketing Scheme, 18 January 1935, which aimed to 
remove inferior potatoes on the market, improving the market for Eastern Canadian potatoes; Western 
Ontario Dry Bean Marketing Scheme, 1 February 1935, focused on discontinuing sales on consignment, 
planned a marketing agency designated by a local board and focused on increasing consumption of dry 
beans in domestic and foreign markets; British Columbia Coast Vegetable Marketing Scheme, 4 March 
1935, to regulate marketing of specific types o f vegetables products on the British Columbia coast and the 
Canada Jam Marketing Scheme, 10 April 1935, which intended to stabilize jam  prices and improve the 
quality o f the product. Ibid., 476-78.
Ibid., 479.
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the depression” stating that the prices of primary products had dropped so far so as to 
prevent primary producers from maintaining a reasonable standard o f living.79
When Mackenzie King’s Liberals won the 1935 General Election, many farmers 
were unsure as to whether the marketing legislation would survive, since King’s Liberals 
did not have a clear agricultural policy.80 As Mackenzie King and the Liberals had 
strongly opposed the establishment of marketing boards and attempted to block their 
formation, many farmers were unsure as to how the new government would answer their 
desires for controlled markets. In 1937, the Privy Council found the Natural Products 
Marketing Act violated section 92(13) of the British North America Act, because it
O 1
interfered with provincial responsibilities for civil and property rights. Following the 
1931 setback in British Columbia, “D uff’ Pattullo’s Liberal government introduced its
own Natural Products Marketing Act in 1936, an act which the courts decided was within
• * • 82the authority of the province. Other provinces soon copied this legislation.
Unlike previous organizations, this new movement towards marketing boards was 
not associated with any semi-secret society or any political cause. The focus was mainly 
economic and the methods were pragmatic.83 Provincial governments responded to the 
need and, despite the earlier setback in British Columbia, worked to improve the position 
of farmers and the production of farm goods through marketing boards. In 1931, the 
Ontario government created the Ontario Marketing Board to survey market conditions 
and make recommendations. This was the first step towards controlling Ontario’s 
agriculture through marketing acts. In 1934, the Milk Control Board of Ontario was
79 Report o f the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 143.
80 MacPherson, ‘An Authoritative Voice,’ 169.
81 Green, ‘Agricultural Marketing Boards in Canada,’ 424.
82 Ian Drummond, ‘Marketing Boards in the White Dominions,’ 202.
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formed to regulate the dairy industry. Later that year, the Milk Control Act required 
licensing of all persons dealing with milk in any form.84 Early in 1932 in response to the 
requests of a group of Ontario hog farmers, Conservative Minister of Agriculture Colonel 
T.L. Kennedy approved a hog improvement program. While it appeared that Kennedy 
supported some form of organized or controlled marketing, statements in his biography 
suggest otherwise, stating that market control would lead to regimentation and 
bureaucracy and be resisted by the farm community.85 Deductions from the price of each 
marketed hog were to finance the organization and a number of farmers voiced their 
support, but the plan was cancelled following the 1934 electoral victory of Mitchell 
Hepburn’s Liberals. Duncan Marshall, the new Agriculture Minister, cancelled the 
program outright, expressing moral and financial opposition.86 However, Ontario passed 
its own marketing legislation, the Ontario Farm Products Control Act, in 1937 and, by 
1940, marketing boards for milk, cheese, peaches, asparagus, pears, cherries, and
87tomatoes were established. The various provincial marketing boards provided producer 
self-government because farmers could make decisions about production and pricing 
without political interference, at least nominally.88
By this time, agriculture’s role in the Ontario economy had declined significantly. 
While agriculture had been among the top industries in Ontario in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, by the 1930s mining played a much larger role in natural 
resources employment. The percentage of the population employed in natural resource
83 MacPherson, ‘An Authoritative Voice,’ 164
84 Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 18.
85 Hyman, Tom Kennedy's Story, 57.
86 W.P. Watson, Toronto, Ontario, to Wilted Bishop, 12 March, 1970 Archival and Special Collections 
University o f Guelph Library, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Correspondence 1969-70.
87 Drummond, ‘Agriculutre,’ in Progress Without Planning, 49; Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in 
Ontario, 75.
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extraction had declined significantly, dropping from 50 per cent in the late nineteenth 
century to less than 20 per cent by 1940.89 While up to 1920 the total amount of land in 
Ontario under cultivation increased, the twentieth century saw an overall decrease in 
cultivated land.90 During the 1930s, the number of farmers decreased dramatically. By 
1933, the real net income per occupied farm was less than 40 per cent of what it had been 
in 1929.91 Through the Depression, the economic position of Ontario farmers slipped, 
both in real terms and relative to the rest of the province. At this time, more than any 
other, the farmers of Ontario required marketing legislation that enabled them to unite 
against the challenges facing the farm population. The decline in Ontario’s farm 
population and number o f farms continued into the 1940s, a situation highlighted by the 
fact that far fewer young people were becoming involved in farming.92 While the number 
of farmers decreased, the over-all production levels of Ontario’s farms did not decrease 
largely due to a growth in farm mechanization.
Farmers increased the productivity of their farms while using less labour and land, 
through mechanization as well as scientific approaches to breeding stock and disease 
control. Increased mechanization, however, required more capital which led to great 
financial difficulty for many farmers. There was little room for inefficiency and farmers 
attempting to make ends meet on small farms found this very hard, if not impossible. To 
justify spending more on machinery, farmers required additional land or livestock.
88 Drummond, ‘Marketing Boards in White Dominions,’ 204.
89 Drummond, ‘What People D id,’ Progress Without Planning, 21.
90 The high point o f cultivated area in Ontario was 1926, when 10.4 million acres were under cultivation; 
by 1941, this had dropped to 9.1 million acres, but between 1880 and 1940 the province nearly doubled its 
cultivated land. Drummond, ‘Agriculture,’ 31.
91 Ibid., 39.
92 David A. Hay and G.S. Barsan investigate this trend in more detail in the chapter entitled ‘The Western 
Canadian Farm Sector: Transition and Trends,’ in The Political Economy o f  Agriculture in Western 
Canada, ed. G.S. Basran and D.A. Hay, 3-22.
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Innovations increasingly found their way into the country home too, and living standards 
improved. Soon these innovations became less of a luxury and more of a necessity. 
Farmers were no longer concerned with simply maintaining the value o f country life, but 
with maintaining, or better utilizing, their market share. Farmers began to apply the 
principles of business and industry to agriculture.94
As Canada once again went to war, the government called upon farmers to 
support the war effort. In December 1939, the Dominion government established a 
Bacon Board, under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Wheat Board, to control the export 
of meat products to the United Kingdom. The prices set by this board determined the 
prices received by Canadian producers. In order to support Canada’s allies, the Bacon 
Board, later renamed the Meat Board, provided bacon to Britain at a low price and 
curtailed supplies to the domestic market to ensure the Canadian supply met British 
demand. As the production of meat increased, so too did the amount of meat staying in 
Canada. If farmers sold more meat on the domestic market, the average price paid out to 
the producers increased.95 While the regulations of the Bacon/Meat Board provided an 
example o f the governments’ willingness to control meat production and marketing, the 
Board also served as a focal point around which hog farmers, especially those in Ontario, 
organized.96 In early spring of 1941, the Ontario Federation of Agriculture encouraged 
county federations to send delegates to a meeting to discuss the establishment o f an 
organization for pork farmers, with the intention of encouraging increased production. 
The initial meeting of the hog committee, held on 21 April 1941, discussed whether hog
93 Rea, The Prosperous Years, 134-35.
94 Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 114.
95 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 15.
96 Ibid., 16-17.
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farmers could use the Farm Products Control Act to develop a marketing scheme for 
their product.97 To this point, no livestock producers had been able to develop a 
marketing scheme. This date marked the beginning of a new era for the Ontario hog 
farmer and livestock farmers across Canada.
Farmers across Canada experimented with various methods of marketing their 
goods, from voluntary pools to government supported marketing boards. Through these 
experiments, the farmers gained an understanding of the effective methods that they 
could use, and were legally allowed to use, in order to control the marketing of their 
products. The various marketing organizations, and the marketing legislation provided by 
the provincial and Dominion governments, established the ground-work upon which the 
hog producers o f Ontario would develop their own marketing legislation.
97 Ibid., 4.
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Chapter Four: Developing the Hog Board
In 1941, the Dominion government controlled the marketing o f Canadian hogs in 
order to ensure the United Kingdom received an adequate supply of good quality meat. 
This desire caused the government to encourage increased production, and it also led 
farmers to develop an organization of their own, in order to acquire the best possible 
prices. As the war ended, Ontario hog farmers grew concerned the government wanted to 
restore the free market, and they would lose the guaranteed income provided by the Meat 
Board. Following the Second World War, Ontario hog farmers utilized the powers 
provided by the Farm Products Control Act to establish an association, then a marketing 
agency, and finally, a co-operative shipping agency. With these organizations, Ontario 
hog farmers were the first group of farmers to establish an exclusive marketing agency. 
The Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board (OHPMB) was the first producer board 
established as an exclusive marketing agency in Ontario, opening its office in April 1946.
Q 0
A web of legal and political struggles soon faced the OHPMB. The Board faced many 
challenges, but it inspired similar boards across the country, making it an interesting case 
study to investigate the development of controlled agricultural marketing in Canada. An 
attempt by many of the original founders of the OHPMB to establish a co-operative 
packing plant reflected, among other things, the degree of control over the market that the 
OHPMB had established.
While there had been an attempt to develop a hog organization in the 1930s, many 
in government felt organizing hog producers in Ontario would be too difficult, as they
98 Rea, The Prosperous Years, 140.
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were too numerous and widespread." Government officials also felt marketing 
programmes were not generally suited to the sale of livestock. 100 While grain growers 
could potentially pool their crop and hold it from market, livestock producers would have 
to sell their animals when they were ready for market or risk seeing the quality of the 
animals deteriorate. 101 The 1935 Royal Commission on Price Spreads, known as the 
Stevens Commission, recognized the difficulty farmers faced in Canada, as there were far 
too few companies purchasing the goods and dictating the prices offered to producers. 102 
The commission expressed specific concern over concentration in the meat-packing 
industry, where two companies, Canada Packers Limited and Swift Canadian Company 
Limited, controlled nearly 85 per cent of the industry’s production. The Commission 
reported;
It may be fairly stated, therefore, that these two companies dominate the 
industry. Their buying and marketing policies affect their smaller competitors 
and largely determine the operating methods of the industry.. .The disparity 
in bargaining power between the farmer and these large packers is obvious.. .103
The strong control of the industry by these few companies had insulated them from the
harshest conditions of the Great Depression. When, in 1929, sales of meat fell by 50.9
per cent and the return to producers fell by 56.8 per cent, returns to the packing industry
only fell by 24.5 per cent.104 These companies worked to ensure, even if the prices they
paid to the producers dropped, the prices charged to consumers, and profits, remained
high.105 The Commission concluded there was a definite need for the organized
marketing o f livestock in Canada to enable primary producers to meet the oligopolistic
99 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 1.
100 Ibid., 7.
101 Report o f  the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 159.
102 Ibid., 6.
103
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power of the packing companies. The Commission suggested creating a Live Stock 
Board, which would have the power to provide information to producers regarding 
production, marketing, stocks, and prices. The Commission further suggested the Live 
Stock Board have the power to deal with disputes between producers and processors and 
the ability to license and supervise truckers, dealers, and export packers. Finally, the 
Commission suggested the Board have the power: “To encourage the organization of 
producers o f live stock for regular and orderly marketing.”106
As early as 1925, it was recognized the quality of Canadian pork could not 
compare with other countries, especially Denmark; many felt this would change if 
Canadian producers were educated and improved production.107 In this light, and with 
hopes of improving the meat provided to Britain, the Ontario government passed The 
Cheese and Hog Subsidy Act in 1941. This Act allowed the Ontario government to 
provide subsidies to farmers for hogs sold through regular trade channels.108 The rate of 
the subsidies increased as the grade of hogs improved thus, encouraging farmers to 
produce better quality animals. The government also intended these subsidies to 
encourage continued production of both cheese and bacon for the war effort, without 




107 M.E. Maybee, Conservative MP for Northumberland had expressed this belief in 1925; Debates House 
of Commons, 4th Session, 14th Parliament, (1925) Vol 2, 1987. In 1929, Conservative Peter
McGibbon (Muskoka-Ontario) stated that Denmark set the standard for the world, in terms of 
bacon production; Ibid, 3rd Session, 16th Parliament (1929) vol 1, 803.
108 The Cheese and Hog Subsidy Act, 1941, Statutes o f Ontario, 1941 Chapter 11 and Regulations 
Respecting 1. Payment of Subsidies to persons who produce certain grades of hogs in Ontario 2. Payment 
of subsidies to persons who produce milk in Ontario which is subsequently processed into cheese (Toronto, 
T.E. Bowman, K ing’s Printer, 1941)
109 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 9.
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While the Ontario Federation of Agriculture initially intended the development of 
the hog producers association to encourage the production of bacon for the war effort, the 
desires of many of its members soon changed this. At the time, the majority of milk and 
cream producers also raised hogs, as they used dairy by-products to provide a cheap and 
reliable protein supplement for hogs. By this point, producer associations already existed 
for Concentrated Milk Producers and Whole Milk Producers, so many hog farmers had 
experience in the area o f producer organizations.110 While it was common for dairy 
farmers to raise hogs, feeding them with by-products provided from their other industries, 
by World War Two, large volume feedlots became more common and farmers began to 
specialize in hog production.111 With this change, farmers developed a greater sense of 
solidarity as a group. Added to this new group consciousness was the fact that the 
average farmer, by 1941, was required to produce food for at least nine others, without 
additional labour. Producers had come to rely on farm implements, which increased the 
cost of production, yet farmers did not see any increase in the monies returned to them,
119especially during wartime. In January 1941, the Ontario Concentrated Milk Producers 
Association declared its readiness to assist hog producers in organizing their own 
association and appointed Charles Mclnnis as their representative.113 This appointment 
set the stage for Charles Mclnnis to play a major role in the future o f thousands of 
Ontario farmers. In March 1941, when hog farmers met in response to the requests of the 
OFA, they expressed concern the Bacon Board did not include a representative for the
110 Ibid, 3; Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 129.
111 Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 130.
112 Ibid., 177, 199.
113 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 4.
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producers. The hog farmers realized their lack of organization limited the government’s 
ability or willingness to select a representative to sit on the Bacon Board.114
The Formation o f the OHPA
On 21 April 1941, the Ontario Federation o f Agriculture held a meeting in the 
Seaway Hotel in Toronto attended by over sixty delegates. The intent o f the meeting was 
to discuss the production and marketing of commercial hogs. The attending delegates 
passed a motion to organize the Commercial Swine Producers o f Ontario. The meeting 
appointed a committee of individuals who would play a major role in the development of 
the hog producers’ organizations including Charles Mclnnis, Wiffed Bishop, and Charles 
Milton. The committee also included a member of the 1934 hog committee, Jack Reid of 
Kent County.115 Members of numerous other commodity groups, such as the Cheese, 
Concentrated Milk, and Whole Milk Producers, expressed the desire to assist the hog 
board in its development.116 Through the summer of 1941, the committee continued to 
develop an organizational strategy and a potential marketing scheme. From the 
beginning, it was clear the committee had high hopes for the organization and would not 
be a place for farmers to chat about their problems. The committee decided an 
organization of hog farmers was necessary, but funding such an organization would be 
difficult. The committee proposed a marketing plan which, when it came into being,
114 Letter from V.S. Milburn, Secretary of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, 25 April 1941, Archival 
and Special Collections University o f Guelph Library, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: 
Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
115 Other members included C.P. McAllister, Walter Galbraith, W. Weber, R. Templer, Harry Hewitt, R.J. 
Scott, W.A. Amos, A.D. Wilson, Harry Wilson, V.S. Milburn and H. Huffman. Minutes o f meeting of the 
Commercial Hog Producers’ Committee o f the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, 2 June 1941, Wilfred L. 
Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
116 Letter from V.S. Milburn, Secretary o f the Ontario Federation o f Agriculture, 25 April 1941, Wilfred L. 
Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
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would include a levy of two or five cents per hog, twenty-five per cent o f which would go 
back to the county associations. The group also decided to retain a positive working 
relationship with the Ontario Federation of Agriculture and, in that light, developed a 
scheme to present to the OFA and from there the Farm Products Control Board. Drawing 
upon Jack Reid’s experience, the committee decided to use the general principles of the 
1934 group. The principles suggested by the OFA also included many of the suggestions 
made in 1935 by the Royal Commission on Price Spreads regarding the establishment of 
a Live Stock Board. The sixteen principles of the group, as outlined, focused on a variety 
of topics, including improving production through education and better disease 
prevention, improving the quality of Canadian bacon, to maintaining a place in the 
British market, and increasing domestic consumption of pork, which included reducing 
importation o f vegetable oils and other fat substitutes. The most interesting principles 
focused on collective action. The group wanted producers to elect representatives to 
approach the governing bodies and pork packing companies. The committee stated their 
desire to ensure the producer received compensation for his product, on parity with the 
things he needed to purchase, while also developing a scheme that would regulate 
production according to the demands of the market. In total, they hoped their 
organization would provide leadership to the provincial industry and increase the
117bargaining power o f the producers.
Over the next few months, the committee of farmers travelled across Ontario to 
raise support for a commodity organization. By autumn of 1941, delegates from counties 
all over Ontario, except for the provisional county of Haliburton and areas termed “the
117 Minutes o f a meeting o f the Commercial Hog Producers’ Committee o f the Ontario Federation of 
Agriculture, 2 June 1941, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association
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territorial districts”, or Northern Ontario, had come together to organize the Ontario Hog 
Producers Association (OHPA). The constitution of the OHPA declared that it was 
designed to “assist the Ontario hog producers to improve the marketing facilities and 
marketing conditions of hog producers in Ontario.”118 Throughout 1941 and into early 
1942, the committee continued to meet with government representatives to discuss the 
Ontario Farm Products Control Board and its possible use by the hog farmers of 
Ontario.119 In March 1942, a conference with the Minister of Agriculture, Liberal P.M. 
Dewan, and senior officials o f the Department of Agriculture enabled representatives of 
the Hog Producers Committee to determine that public meetings should test the proposed 
plan, township by township, to gauge the farmers support for the plan.120 While the 
committee clearly desired the creation of a commodity group, some officials were 
concerned about creating separate commodity organizations, fearing it would lead to 
confusion around what the Federation of Agriculture did. The representatives felt the 
commodity groups should remain a part of the OFA, and not act independently.121
By late March 1942, members of the committee informed the hog producers of 
Ontario that the OHPA, subject to the approval of the Farm Products Control Board, 
would govern the marketing of hogs in Ontario. A number of county hog producer 
organizations were also developed, either in the form of a separate Hog Producers’
Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
118 A Brief History o f  "Producer-Marketing" o f  Hogs in Ontario, 1941 -57,2. W ilfred L Bishop 
Collection, Box 23, Folder: Ontario Hog Producers M arketing Plans, 1941-57.
119 Outline o f  Development o f  Ontario Hog Producers’ Association, dated Spring 1945, Wilfred L. Bishop 
Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
120 Ibid.
121 Letter from J. Stewart Cooper, Ontario Department o f Agriculture Representative, Grey County, to 
Wilfred Bishop, 10 March 1942. Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer 
Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
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Association or as a hog producers’ committee of the county Federation of Agriculture.122
This required the establishment of a negotiating committee of farmers and processors to
deal with the concerns of the farmers. The committee informed farmers of their plans to
grant licenses to dealers and processors to better organize the industry. While the
committee was concerned with the current economic situation, it was also clear the
committee had the future of the industry in mind;
Among other purposes of less importance, your committee hopes that 
this proposed organization will bring new confidence in the industry 
to producers at the present time and so stimulate our contribution to the 
Empire’s war effort. After the war, we hope that through our organization 
we may prevent hardships to the producers resulting from a very possible 
over-supplied post-war market.12
Farmer support for the plan grew and at the 7 April 1942 Annual Convention of the
Ontario Federation of Agriculture, the chairman of the hog producer committee, Charles
‘Charlie’ Mclnnis, stated the committee had received support from over 2,500 hog
producers in Ontario. In more than forty-five meetings held in five counties, only one
farmer had expressed opposition. Through seventy Farm Radio Forums, farmers had
expressed their opinion on the plan, with the vast majority supporting the ideas. 124
Twenty-five counties gave unanimous support for the plan, whereas six forums had
expressed concerns. Those in attendance at two meetings in Huron County felt the hog
association should not be a separate association, but work directly through the Federation
122 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 14.
123 Letter to Hog Producers of Ontario from W ilfred Bishop, 20 March 1942, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, 
Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
124 Farm Radio Forums were meetings of local community groups, sponsored by the CBC, the Canadian 
Association for Adult Education, and the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. Each week, members of the 
community would meet to listen to national farm broadcasts. After the broadcast, those attending would 
discuss questions presented by the broadcasters and the opinions were reported to provincial officers. 
Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 12.
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of Agriculture.125 With the results of these county meetings before them, the Annual 
OFA meeting (which was also the first provincial meeting of the Hog Producers), 
approved, in principle, the constitution and by-laws for a new commodity association and 
the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Scheme.126
Despite farmers’ support of the plan, officials from the Department of Agriculture 
continued to voice the opinion that it would be too difficult to operate a marketing plan 
that handled the livestock for all of Southern Ontario.127 The war in Europe also 
presented other problems for the organizers o f the hog producers. In a letter explaining 
why the organization of the Hog Producers had stalled, Bishop stated; “We have found 
that federal control over prices and marketing has been such as to make impractical the 
use of the Ontario Farm Products Control Act as a basis for organizing Hog Producers in 
Ontario.”128 Instead of attempting to implement collective bargaining or a marketing 
scheme, the OHPA, working with the Ontario Department of Agriculture’s Swine 
Committee, encouraged production. Farmers were encouraged to increase production 
and the material focused on how this increased farmers’ profit while at the same time
1 ?Qincreasing support for the war effort. The efforts of the farmers and the ODA met with 
some success and by 1942 hog production increased by nearly 60 per cent over pre-war 
levels.130
125 Report o f the Hog Producers’ Committee o f the Ontario Federation of Agriculture to the Minister and 
the Ontario Department o f Agriculture, 1942
126 ‘Hog Scheme is Approved and Constitution A dopted,’ The Rural Co-operator, Vol 6, No 8, 14 April 
1942.
127 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 14.
128 Letter from W.L. Bishop to D.J. MacDonald, 7 December 1942, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, 
Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
129 ‘Save the Little Pigs’, Ontario Department o f Agriculture, December 1942, Wilfred L. Bishop 
Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
130 Letter from P.E. Light, of the Bacon Board, to Wilfred Bishop, 10 July 1942, Wilfred L. Bishop
Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
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Throughout this period, and into early 1943, there was some confusion as to the 
power and position o f the Hog Producers Association. As late as early 1943, Wilfred 
Bishop still signed his letters as Field Secretary of the Hog Producer Section of the 
Ontario Federation of Agriculture, without asserting a separate role for the Hog
131Producers Association. In April 1943, however, the OFA recognized the OHPA as a
separate organization and granted the organization membership.132 In the early years of
the OHPA, confusion remained regarding the proper role of the organization. As the
federal government continued to control marketing during the war, planning for producer
controlled markets was moot. The OHPA was still interested in improving the prices hog
farmers received and, with this concern in mind, continued to question the lack of farmer
representation on the government’s Bacon Board. The OHPA argued the lack of farmer
representation did not follow democratic principles and, in fact, seriously hampered the
war effort. In a letter to Prime Minister King, the secretary of the OHPA suggested that
if the Bacon Board did not have farmer representation and called for more hogs to be sent
to Britain, the price paid to producers would fall, as export prices were controlled and
therefore below domestic prices. A decrease in money to producers would result in fewer
1
hogs raised, and there would be less support for the war effort.
The motions presented at the 1943 annual meeting of the OHPA reflected the 
numerous concerns o f Ontario’s hog producers. The accepted motions included requests 
for purchasers to state the basic price paid for hogs on return slips, along with weight and
131 This can be seen through numerous letters collected in the Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20,
Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
132 Letter to Bishop from V.S. Milbrun, Secretary o f OFA, 19 April 1943, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, 
Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
133 Letter to Prime Minister MacKenzie King from Wilfred Bishop, 14 April 1943, Wilfred L. Bishop 
Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.
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grade. The assembled producers also asked the Bacon Board be composed of 
representatives from both the producers and packing industry. Despite this motion, 
farmers, in fact, never achieved representation on the Bacon Board.134 Another motion 
asked processors and other individuals in the packing industry to levy one quarter of one 
per cent o f the sale value of each hog producer to help finance the Association. Likewise, 
the producers passed a motion asking the provincial government to adopt legislation 
which allowed producers to collect a levy to finance those groups promoting the interests 
of a particular commodity group.135 The proposed levy was of major importance, as the 
numerous county hog associations faced difficulty organizing, and lacked the funds 
needed to carry out substantial organizational efforts.136 A representative of the 
government informed the OHPA that if it wished to deduct levies from hogs, it would 
have to enter into negotiations with packers and processors, and it suggested the 
association incorporate before it entered into any such agreement. 137 As it became clear 
that the war would soon end, farmers grew increasingly concerned about their position 
following the war.
The OHPA believed, as the war ended, the high war production levels encouraged 
by the government would result in production far out-stripping domestic demand, and
ITSthis would lead to a drop in hog prices. The Association lobbied the government to
134 Letter to W.A. Goodfellow, Minister of Agriculture, from Morley Mills, 6 January 1961, Archival and 
Special Collections, University of Guelph Library, Collection relating chiefly to Ontario Hog Producers’ 
Association; also files on the Hemlock Farm Co-operative, F.A.M.E., C.B.C. farm broadcasts, personal 
clippings and other matters relating to Morley Mills, 1958-1984
135 Motions of Annual Meeting o f the Ontario Hog Producers Association, April 14, 1943. Wilfred L. 
Bishop Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941- June 1943.
136 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 22.
137 Letter from Solicitor o f Ontario Department o f Agriculture to Bishop, 11 May 1943, Wilfred L. Bishop 
Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941- June 1943.
138 Minutes of the Annual Meeting o f the Oxford Hog Producers Association, March 27, 1945. Wilfred L. 
Bishop Collection, Box 13: Oxford County Hog Producers’ Association, Constitution, Minutes.
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maintain support for hog farmers and the government listened.139 James Gardiner, 
Dominion Minister o f Agriculture, contacted the OHPA to inform them the government 
had re-negotiated its supply contract with Great Britain to ensure producers would at least 
receive a minimum price for their products.140 This relationship would last until at least 
1947. The OHPA considered asking the government to guarantee a floor price for hogs, 
but others involved in the co-operative movement cautioned against this, as a floor price 
might encourage excessive production, further exacerbating the situation.141 The Ontario 
Federation of Agriculture also demanded greater intervention from the provincial 
government, including measures to ensure the survival of price stabilization, collective 
marketing, planned production, and press for co-operative purchase and sale. The 
problem faced by farmers was not how to increase input to meet the demands of wartime, 
but rather decreasing supply to maintain prices.142 Donald C. MacDonald, Leader of the 
CCF in Ontario, suggests that only during wartime, when the government implemented 
orderly marketing, did the farmers actually receive a fair deal.143 
Developing a Marketing Scheme
As the war ended, and the free market returned, the economic situation of farmers 
once again slipped into depression. One of the major problems facing the Association 
was the fact farmers delivered 90 per cent of their hogs directly to processing plants 
without any price negotiations and were thus, entirely dependent on the offers made by
139 This began as early as 1943, as w itnessed by a letter from Bishop to M em bers o f the House of 
Commons from Rural Ridings, 26 November 1943, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario 
Hog Producer Association Correspondence July 1943- 1944.
140 Letter to Bishop from James Gardiner, Dominion Minister of Agriculture, 23 October 1943, Wilfred L. 
Bishop Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence July 1943-1944.
141 Letter to Bishop from R.J. Scott, President o f the United Farmers Co-operative Company Limited, 9 
June 1944, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association 
Correspondence July 1943- 1944.
142 Rea, The Prosperous Years, 137-38.
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buyers. The remaining ten per cent of hogs left on the open market set the open market 
price for hogs.144 Farmers developed two schools of thought regarding how to deal with 
this situation. Some farmers supported building their own packing plants to benefit from 
some of the profits made in the meat-packing business. This was first attempted by the 
First Co-operative Packers of Ontario (COPACO) in the 1930s. Other farmers, led by 
Mclnnis and the OHPA, felt co-operatives would never give farmers complete control 
over their livestock products and urged the establishment of a strong marketing board.145 
Fearing the end of controlled marketing, the OHPA ensured they could achieve control 
over marketing.
By the post-war era, organized Canadian farmers had accepted the existing 
political system and were working within it, relying on the laws passed by the Canadian 
parliament and the Ontario Legislative assembly to support their organizations. Farmers 
seemed to move away from supporting a laissez-faire system, towards schemes for 
planned production and orderly marketing.146 After the Second World War, industry in 
Ontario increased greatly, with a corresponding increase in well-paying jobs and non­
farm jobs in general, resulting in the abandonment of farms in some areas and a decline 
in farm labour generally.147 As their relative population once again decreased, Ontario 
farmers abandoned efforts to elect farmer political parties. Unlike farmers on the prairies, 
who supported the CCF or, in Alberta, the Social Credit, farmers in Ontario essentially
143 M acDonald, The H appy Warrior, 233.
144 History Objectives Marketing Methods of the Ontario Hog Producers Association, Marketing Board and 
Co-operative plus some observations of the economics of Ontario’s Hog Industry; January 1958; 
Information Department, Ontario Federation of Agriculture.
145 John R. Phillips, ‘What Happened to Fame,’ Canadian Co-operative Digest 8 No. 4, Winter 1965, 5, 
Leonard Harman/ United Co-operatives of Ontario Collection, Farmers Allied Meat Enterprises File 2, 
1964-1965..
146 MacPherson, ‘An Authoritative Voice,’ 180.
147 Drummond, ‘Impact o f the Post-War Industrial Expansion on Ontario’s Agriculture,’ 84.
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abandoned organized farmers’ parties and largely supported the federal Conservative 
party.148 On the provincial level, areas that once supported the UFO switched their 
support to the Liberals.149 Despite a merger between the UFO and the CCF, the CCF did 
not find much support among farmers and instead relied on urban-industrial ridings for 
support.150 Only the Conservative party possessed a solid base o f dependable 
constituencies in the rural areas o f Ontario.151 Giving up on electing their own political 
representatives, farmers decided to work within the system and sought legislation to 
support their efforts.
Early in 1945, hog farmers circulated a petition requesting a vote for the 
establishment of a hog marketing scheme and collected over five thousand signatures. 
Responding to this overwhelming support, Kennedy, Minister o f Agriculture in Ontario’s 
Conservative government, announced the Department of Agriculture would supervise a 
vote regarding the formation of a marketing scheme. The proposed plan included 
authority for a body of hog producers to negotiate with packers and truckers. The 
proposal also allowed the OFIPA to deduct a levy of two cents per hog, an amount seen as 
too low by the OHPA, but accepted for the time being.152 By November 1945, the hog 
producers had secured draft regulations from the Ontario Farm Products Marketing 
Board. The Hog Producers were required to present these regulations to all hog 
producers in every county in Southern Ontario for a vote. Districts in Northern Ontario 
were specifically exempt from the proposed scheme, by reason of geography and
148 Wrong, ‘Party Voting in Canada,’ 253, 258.
149 Wrong, ‘Ontario Provincial Elections,’ 399.
150 Ibid., 400.
151 Ibid., 402.
152 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 33.
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isolation.153 As the vote approached, representatives of the OHPA travelled across 
southern Ontario seeking support for the plan through county meetings.
In these meetings and the process up to this point, Charles Mclnnis emerged as 
the “most dynamic and colourful leader on the Ontario farm front.”154 Mclnnis had 
experience in the farmers’ movement, having been involved in the Concentrated Milk 
Producers Board and having served on the Executive of the Ontario Federation of 
Agriculture. Described as “a unique personality” and as being “absolutely sincere, totally 
dedicated, honest, unselfish and eloquent,” Mclnnis was “wholly devoted to the 
betterment o f the farmer” and “indefatigable”. 155 Mclnnis had strong views on how to 
improve the situation for farmers, and was oftentimes intolerant of those who disagreed 
with him. This led to tension and splits within the OHPA and his opponents viewed him 
as paranoid.156 In his steadfast devotion to the cause of the organized farmer, and his 
suspicion of the motives of the government, corporations and even farmers who 
disagreed with him, Mclnnis was reminiscent of the farm leaders who had come before 
him, like E.A. Partridge, T.A. Crerar and J.J. Morrison. Without the energetic and 
dominating personality o f Charlie Mclnnis, the OHPA would never have acquired the 
status and prominence it did, and Ontario would not have developed a compulsory hog 
marketing system.157 Mclnnis fought “fire with fire” and “was certainly the undisputed 
leader” o f the organized hog farmers’ movement.158 While Mclnnis’ strong personality
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid., 32.
155 Ibid., 33; Charley Mclnnis Walks a Lonely Road, Monetary Times, January 1966, 51; MacDonald, The 
Happy Warrior, 237.
156 Ibid.; Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 33.
157 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 33; Phillips, ‘What Happened to Fame,’ 6.
158 Phillips, ‘What Happened to Fame,’ 5.
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later caused problems for him and the organizations he was involved in, during the 1940s 
it benefited the Ontario hog farmers.
Following Mclnnis’ “barnstorming” campaign across the province, nearly thirty- 
two thousand hog producers registered to vote on the hog marketing schem e.159 Almost 
thirty thousand people voted yes and only two hundred and five voted no, thus 
authorizing the establishment of the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board (OHPMB). 
Those involved in the hog producers’ association viewed the vote as a clear indication 
“ .. .that the hog producers of Ontario were extremely anxious to break clear o f the 
controls o f the trade and enjoy a new economic freedom, by being able collectively to 
market their hogs.”160 With clear support o f the proposed scheme, Ontario’s hog 
producers were given the authority to elect a seven-person board with the power to 
control the marketing of all hogs in Ontario and regulate their sale in accordance with the 
Farm Products Control A c t}61 While the board experienced some difficulties bringing 
the scheme into effect, the OHPMB immediately went to work, opening its first office in 
April 1946.162 The marketing scheme came into affect on 1 May 1946 under the authority 
of the seven-member board of Alva Rintoul, W.E. Tummon, Heber McCague, Wilfred 
Bishop, Norman McLeod, George Johnson and, Clayton Frey. Charlie Mclnnis was not 
officially a member of the board but, as President of the OHPA, sat in on meetings.163 
The Board and the Association, while officially separate entities, maintained close ties. 
The OHPMB provided substantial funds to the OHPA annually, ranging from $14,000 to
159 Ibid,
160 A B rief History o f  'Producer-Marketing' o f  Hogs in Ontario, 1941-57, 4-6, Bishop Collection, Box 23 
Folder: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plans, 1941-57.
161 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 34.
162 Minutes ofA nnual Meeting o fthe Oxford County HPA, 8 February 1946. Box 13: Oxford County Hog 
Producers’ Association, Constitution, Minutes
163 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 36.
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$32,000.164 These funds were provided by the levy on each hog sold. The annual
meetings of the OHPA and the local organizations often included resolutions requesting
the OHPMB to take specific actions or criticizing the board for actions taken. For
example, a 1948 meeting o f the Oxford County HPA executive criticized the members of
the OHPMB for not following the established precedents of other farm organizations to
achieve the best possible price for producers’ products.165
Throughout the summer of 1946, a negotiating committee of representatives from
the OHPMB and the meat-packing firms discussed the problems of the industry. By 1
March 1947, the committee developed rules respecting the sale o f hogs and the Farm
Products Marketing Boards approved.166 The packers agreed they would grade all
slaughtered hogs according to government standards and the trucking companies agreed
to tattoo or mark each hog before leaving the farmer’s lot, to ensure each farmer received
proper payment for his hogs. These agreements reflected efforts to establish a universal
quality program.167 The changes also reflected efforts to end the under-grading and
168under-weighing farmers felt was common when selling hogs to packinghouses. In a 
further effort to improve the quality of hogs, the Ontario legislature passed Bill No. 37 in 
1947 to provide subsidies for hog and cheese production, and to assist the British in 
rebuilding their economy. The subsidy was useful in encouraging continued production 
as only Ontario hog farmers, among all the Canadian provinces, maintained their 1945
164 Evidenced by the Auditor Reports for the Ontario Hog Producers’ Association, in the Wilfred L. Bishop 
Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario Hog Producers Association Meetings, Resolutions, 1947-59.
165 Minutes of the Oxford County HPA Executive meeting, 6 March 1948, Box 13: Oxford County Hog 
Producers’ Association, Constitution, Minutes.
166 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 39.
167 Ibid., 39-41
168 Report o f the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 162.
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production levels. In his support for the bill, Agriculture Minister Kennedy stated 
Ontario hog farmers were not receiving everything they should for their hogs.169
Following the establishment of the negotiating committee, the OHPMB continued 
its efforts to improve the situation of Ontario hog farmers. Owing largely to the “old 
fashioned evangelist” rhetoric of ‘Charlie’ Mclnnis, the grassroots strength of the 
association was growing.170 Mclnnis spoke out against interests that “exploited farm 
people,” declaring; “It was our fore bearers who cleared the land and built this country. 
Why should we be second class citizens?”171 By 1948, county associations were 
becoming quite active, checking on local processors to ensure they were adhering to the 
marketing plan, deducting funds for the association, and paying out adequate prices.172 
The local associations also lobbied the government, to improve the situation of hog 
farmers and the provincial organizations representing Ontario’s hog farmers. At their 
1948 annual meeting, the Oxford County HPA, members went on record to ask that the 
fees collected by the government on behalf of the local boards be increased to five cents
1 71per hog, as the two cent rate collected was inadequate. The OHPMB was not able to 
change the marketing methods through its negotiating committee meetings. By 1950, the 
OHPMB and the county associations were discussing the establishment of a central 
marketing agency to control the sale of hogs.174
169 Legislature o f Ontario Debates, 3rd Session, 23rd Legislature, 10 March 1947,44-45.
170 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 45.
171 Ibid., 46.
172 Ibid., 47.
173 Minute Book of the Oxford County Hog Producers Association from 1948 to 1961, Wilfred L. Bishop 
Collection, Box 13, 3.
174 Minute book of the Perth County Hog Producer Association, 1947-1958, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, 
Box 13, 8.
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In 1951, the processors informed the OHPMB they would not negotiate prices 
anymore, effectively ending the work of the negotiating committee.175 The negotiating 
committee had not been successful up to that point, as the OHPMB members stated 
whenever they mentioned a minimum price, the packer representatives on the committee
♦ • 17 f\ •reacted with hostility. Following the end of price negotiations, the OHPMB 
immediately set to work to establish a central marketing agency to increase prices.177 
With the help of commission firms operating on the Toronto Stock Yards, the Hog 
Producers formed a new company, United Livestock Sales Limited (ULS). Under the 
authority o f the Farm Products Marketing Act, the ULS began operating as the marketing 
agency for the OHPMB on 1 February 195 3.178 The ULS set the price for hogs by using 
the prices paid at other major centres, and publicized the information daily.179 The ULS 
immediately met with serious difficulties. Opposition to the ULS came from those 
processors who extended under-the-table payments to transporters. Such payments often 
averaged at least $1.00 per hog shipped.180 Direct shipping to processors ensured the ULS
i o 1
only controlled ten per cent of the hogs on the market. The ULS informed farmers they 
had to insist their truckers adhere to directives coming from the company since, in order 
to obtain the true value o f hogs at the public market, the agency had to direct transporters
175 Royal Commission on Price Spreads o f Food Products -  R -118 - The Role o f Marketing Boards in 
Canadian Food Marketing 19 May 1959, 38.
176 Address from Charles Mclnnis to Annual Meeting of Ontario Hog Producers Association, 6 March 
1957, Co-operative Union o f Ontario Collection, Archival and Special Collections University o f Guelph 
Library, File: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative 1948-1958
177 Minutes o f  Perth County Hog Producers, 11.
178 Letter to all Hog killers in the province o f Ontario, from the OHPMB Secretary-Treasurer 12 January 
1953, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: United Livestock Sales Ltd., 1953-54.
179 Posting “To Whom it may concern,” Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: United Livestock Sales Ltd., 
1953-54.
180 ‘A Brief History o f ‘Producer-Marketing” o f Hogs in Ontario, 1941-57’, 10; Wilfred L. Bishop 
Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plans, 1941-57.
181 ‘The Role o f Marketing Boards in Canadian Food Market’, 39.
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to deliver hogs to the Ontario Stock Yard.182 Some opposition to the ULS arose from 
other farm organizations. A meeting held in September 1954 revealed that approximately 
500 farmers were opposed to the ULS and had even asked the government to abolish the 
company.183 In December 1954, the Ontario Farmers Union presented the OHPMB with 
its opposition to the ULS, suggesting the OHPMB hold meetings to find out how farmers 
would like their hogs to be marketed.184 The objections to the ULS resulted largely from 
the belief that the OHPMB had given farmers’ rights to a private company operating in 
the interest of its shareholders and not the farmers.185
The Ontario Department of Agriculture also weighed in on the situation. As 1954 
drew to a close, the Department of Agriculture claimed a mistake had been made in the 
hog producer regulations and only the Farm Products Marketing Board could appoint a 
selling agency. The Hog Producers groups objected, arguing the government was in error 
on this judgement. Recognizing the principle of collective selling was working, and with 
some encouragement from the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, the Department of 
Agriculture agreed to the idea of a central selling agency. The Department of Agriculture 
laid out the terms under which it would be willing to accept the principles of collective 
selling and the OHPMB’s appointment of a selling agency. First among these was that 
the selling agency should not be a private company, as it would be building up profits
182 “Are We Creating and Maintaining Price by Directing Your Hogs”, C.D. Black, General Manager of the 
United Livestock Sales Limited, 19 August 1953, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23; United Livestock 
Sales Ltd., 1953-54.
183 John T. Schmidt, ‘Town and County,1 Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 25 September 1954.
184 ‘Ditch ULS, Farm Union Urges Board,’ Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 23 December 1954.
185 ‘A Hog Marketing Protest Meeting at Stratford,’ Farmer’s Advocate and Canadian Countryman, 9 
October 1954.
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through a government-delegated monopoly. The government suggested a co-operative be 
formed to take over the role of the ULS.186
In the face of this opposition, the OHPMB and the OHPA sought to reassure 
farmers of the importance of collective bargaining. Dispensing with the services of the 
ULS, the OPHMB created the Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative (OHPC), to act as the 
marketing agency for Ontario’s hog producers.187 J.R. Kohler, General Manager of the 
ULS, was hired to act as General Manager of the Co-operative.188 This hiring ensured 
that, while private shareholders no longer controlled the marketing agency, the 
management remained consistent. While the OHPMB had dispensed with the services of 
the ULS, it was not because the board was unhappy with the services of the ULS, but 
because it was responding to public criticism. The OHPC began operating as the selling 
agency on 30 May 1955. At this point, the boards of the OHPA, OHPMB, and the OPHC
1 OQ f
consisted of the same individuals. While the different groups were legally separate
entities, the overlap in board members ensured the concerns of one organization became 
the concerns of all the hog producers’ organizations. When the OHPC was created, 
however, there were not many concerns. The OHPMB viewed the progress up to that 
point as favourable. The Board informed its members and farmers across the province 
that in the period since a selling agency had been established discrepancies in the prices 
of hogs between Toronto and Montreal prices had been cut in half, from Toronto’s price 
being $1.00 to $1.25 below Montreal’s price to its being only fifty cents below. 
Meanwhile the price gap between Toronto and Winnipeg, had increased. In 1951, the
186 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 88.
187 ‘Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative,’ The Ontario Gazette, 21 May 1955, 21.
188 Minutes of meeting of OHPC, 2 May 1955, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog 
Producers Co-operative, 1955-61.
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Toronto price was $1.00 above Winnipeg but, by 1955, Toronto was $3.50 above 
Winnipeg.190
In less than fifteen years, Mclnnis and the organized hog producers had made 
substantial progress. They had developed three provincial-wide organizations. By 
utilizing the marketing legislation of the province, the organized hog producers had 
changed the industry from one dominated by packers and processors to an industry in 
which farmers had significant influence. The establishment of these organizations was 
significant, yet over the next half decade significant challenges would arise, for the hog 
producers’ organizations.
189 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 89.
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Chapter Five: This Little Piggy Goes to Court
Up to 1955, the Ontario Hog Producers Association, Ontario Hog Producer 
Marketing Board, and the Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative precipitated major 
changes in the hog industry. They also established a pattern for other sectors of the 
agricultural industry to follow. As the hog producers created a stronger role for their 
organization by building a central selling agency and attempting to end processor control, 
opposition to their plans increased. Between 1955 and 1960, there were constant legal 
challenges to the organizations or their members, which threatened the existence of the 
Board. Despite these challenges, the hog producer organizations were able to maintain 
single-desk selling power, benefiting the producers. While farmers witnessed the rise of 
the single-desk, they also saw the failure of attempts to establish co-operative meat 
packing.
The first significant challenge came from Theodore Parker and received ample 
attention in the media. Parker, Reeve of Ellice Township in Perth County, voiced his 
opposition to the marketing plan and launched a legal challenge to the authority of the 
Marketing Board in February 1955.191 Parker organized several meetings to attack and 
point out the flaws in the marketing plan. Parker often seemed confused as to the 
functions of the negotiating committee and the sales agency. Supporters of the hog 
producer organizations responded strongly to Parker’s opposition.192 By June 1955, the 
Supreme Court o f Ontario informed members of the Board and hog farmers that the court 
case regarding the legality of the OHPMB and the central selling agency had been
191 Bishop. Men and Pork Chops, 94.
192 Ibid., 92.
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dismissed.193 The OHPMB viewed the dismissal of the court case as a boost to its 
position, yet this was just the first of many legal challenges they would face.
As the Board and the Co-operative moved forward with plans to implement 
central selling, or placing the sale of all hogs under one agency, more legal troubles 
caused the organizations to hesitate. In October 1955, Conservative Premier Leslie Frost 
announced he would request the Supreme Court of Canada to rule on the validity of 
Ontario’s marketing legislation. The OHPMB went on record expressing its willingness 
for the Ontario Hog Producers’ Marketing Scheme to be used in this legal review.194 
However, the plans o f the OHPC were delayed by this case, and plans to begin a direction 
program, which would legally require producers and truckers to sell through the agency 
and not directly to processors, were postponed. The direction program would require 
truckers to deliver hogs to established co-operative stockyards. The OHPC would then 
direct truckers where to deliver the hogs, based on the best price achieved through 
auction. The OHPC felt it could not enforce a direction program if  the marketing 
legislation backing it was under review by the Supreme Court.195 During the period the 
legislation was before the courts, the price of hogs dropped from an average of $28.31 
per hundred pounds to an average o f $24.00 per hundred pounds. Charlie Mclnnis 
presented this price drop as evidence that marketing legislation benefited farmers.196
Despite the pending Supreme Court decision, the OPHC moved ahead and 
constructed a series of stockyards and assembly points, which operated on a voluntary
193 Letter to Executive, Presidents and Secretaries of the County HPA and County Federations of 
Agriculture from N.G. McLeod, Secretary-Treasurer o f OHPMB, 2 June 1955, Wilfred L Bishop 
Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative, 1955-61.
194 Ibid., 91.
195 Minutes of OHPC meeting 31 October 1955, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog 
Producers Co-operative, 1955-61.
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nature. The Hog Producers intended to use the assembly points as a way to prevent direct 
shipping; truckers would be required to deliver hogs to these assembly points, located 
around the province. After the OHPC arranged a sale, the truckers would deliver the 
hogs to the company that purchased the hogs.197 The assembly points would also allow 
the selling agency to distribute hogs from areas o f over-production to those of under­
production in the province, with the intention of improving the prices paid to farmers.198 
The OHPC continued its construction of stockyards through 1955 and 1956, with new 
yards generally being built near packing plants. In April 1956, the OHPMB canvassed the 
opinion o f over thirty-four thousand hog producers and announced that 88 per cent of 
those canvassed voiced their support for the OHPMB’s program. Based on this support, 
the OHPMB began directing hogs on a voluntary basis in the Grey and Bruce counties 
issuing directional orders, and attempting to forbid processors from taking hogs not 
bought on the open market.199 Even with the authority of marketing legislation in 
question, the OHPC encouraged farmers not to participate in direct shipping. Farmers 
were told that those who allowed direct shipping were “ .. .just cutting the throats of the 
farmers that are trying to do something for themselves. If we ever loose [sic] this fight, 
we will have lost all the ground that we have gained.”200 In June 1956, the meat packers
196 Address by Charles Mclnnis to the Annual Meeting of the OHPA, 6 March 1957, Co-operative Union of 
Ontario Collection: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative, 1948-1958.
197 Royal Commission on Price Spreads of Food Products, ‘The Role of Marketing Boards in Canadian 
Food M arket’, 39.
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199 ‘A Brief History o f “Producer-Marketing” of Hogs in Ontario, 1941-57,’ 21, Wilfred L. Bishop 
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agreed to discontinue paying truckers bonuses to bring hogs to a particular plant. In 
August 1956 , representatives of the Canadian Council of Packers and the Domestic 
Packers approached the government to complain about the sales methods used by the 
OHPC. The dispute was brought before the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Board in 
September 1956, with the Meat Packers Council complaining the method of sale used by 
the OHPC, auction via telephone, was not open and fair and prevented the major packers 
from having access to the needed proportion of hogs produced in Ontario.202
In January 1957, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled the Ontario Farm Products 
Marketing Act and the regulations of the Hog Producers’ Marketing Board were legal. 
Following this announcement, the Board began to move ahead with its assembly yard 
program again. The decision of the Supreme Court resulted in some amendments to the 
Farm Products Marketing Act and the Agricultural Products Marketing Act, which 
allowed farmers to market their products more effectively and delegated more power to 
local boards. In July 1957 , a new set of hog marketing regulations came into effect, 
strengthening the legal status of the Ontario scheme. However, opposition to the 
Marketing Board continued, and the processors and Meat Packers’ Council still lobbied 
the government to end the OHPMB.204 Responding to pressure from the meat packers and 
farmers opposed to the marketing board, Conservative Minister of Agriculture W.A. 
Goodfellow announced in October 1957 the government would hold a plebiscite on the 
hog plan.205 A large number o f farmers expressed their opposition to another vote as did
201 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 111.
202 ‘A Brief History o f “Producer-Marketing” of Hogs in Ontario, 1941-57,’ 23, Wilfred L. Bishop 
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the political opposition. Reflecting on the situation years later, Donald C. MacDonald,
Leader o f the Ontario NDP, stated;
the Tories said farmers had the right to work out their own marketing plan.
Hog producers took them at their word and asked that no vote be taken on what 
sort of plan that should be until they’d had a year’s experience with the new 
system of regional yards. Suddenly the government, pressured by its rural 
caucus members, who in turn had caved in to the big packers’ lobbying, 
announced that a vote would be held in March (later delayed to July), when only 
fourteen of the producing counties had been able to set up assembly yards.206
G.F. Perkins, Chairman of the Farm Products Marketing Board, told the OHPA that when
the farmers voted on the proposed scheme in 1945, it was never the intention hog
producers would set up a marketing agency, especially one which established minimum
prices.207 The OHPMB itself did not express opposition to the vote, but its members were
determined to ensure the plebiscite would be a victory for the association.208 The hope
was that, once the vote was complete, it would secure the future of the OHPMB.
The campaign period produced a fierce debate. While the OHPMB expected they
would need only a simple majority o f voters supporting the plan, 51 per cent, the Farm
Products Marketing Board decided 66 and 2/3 per cent of voters would have to vote yes
in order to maintain the Ontario Hog Producers’ Marketing Plan. The list of eligible
voters was comprised o f producers, with one name representing each farm that produced
hogs.209 Supporters of the plan, including the OHPA and OHPMB, handed out
information pamphlets which emphasized the “remarkable spirit of co-operation” that the
206 M acDonald, The H appy W arrior, 235.
207 ‘A Brief History of “Producer-Marketing” ofH ogs in Ontario, 1941-57,’ 28, Wilfred L. Bishop 
Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plan, 1941-57.
208 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 114.
209 Package sent out to Ontario hog producers from the Farm Products Marketing Board, re: Ontario Hog 
Producers’ Marketing Plan, 20 June 1958, Co-operative Union of Ontario Collection: Ontario Hog 
Producers Co-operative, 1948-1958.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
work of the hog producers represented.210 Opposition to the plan presented its case as 
well; “Fronts for those parts o f the packing trade who disliked the producer programme 
possible [sic] ran ads in newspapers. Under the signatures of producers they condemned 
the present methods of sale.”211 The Ontario Federation of Agriculture supported the 
OHPMB in their campaign and articles explaining the marketing board appeared in urban 
newspapers.212
On 25 July 1958 hog producers across Ontario voted on the future of the hog 
marketing organization. Hog producers were presented with a ballot that read: “Are you 
in favour o f the Ontario Hog Producers’ Marketing Plan?”213 The results of the plebiscite 
surprised both the supporters and opponents of the plan. The final tally of the votes 
showed that more than 37,000, or 68 per cent of those voting, were in favour of the 
board. This surprised the opponents of the board. The OHPMB and the Co-operative 
Union of Ontario felt the vote was: “a clear indication o f their [producers] support and 
confidence placed in your organization and in Charlie Mclnnis himself by the producers 
of this province.”214 The county-by-county breakdown of the vote further surprised the 
supporters o f the board. Fifteen counties gave overwhelming support, at over 80 per 
cent; nineteen counties gave moderate support, from 60 to 80 per cent; and eight counties 
did not support the board, voting less than 60 per cent in favour. Supporters of the 
Marketing Board were shocked at the number of Western Ontario counties that voted
210 ‘The Burford Marketing Point,’ March 1958, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog 
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“no”.215 The two counties that returned the highest support were areas that did not have 
compulsory direction. Many believed because the ballot was unclear, a “yes” vote merely 
supported the status quo. This misunderstanding led to further controversy regarding the 
vote.216
Complaints about irregularities in the vote were made public almost immediately. 
While the official poll results showed that 79,994 individuals were eligible to vote, only 
37,151 or 47 per cent had voted. While 68 per cent of those that voted supported the 
plan, only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote supported the plan in the end.217 A group 
of hog farmers and truckers, calling themselves the ‘Free Enterprise Hog Producers’, took 
the battle to the Supreme Court of Ontario. The members of the group presented 
information on problems surrounding the vote. Included in these complaints were stories 
of placards supporting the “yes” position being present at polling stations.218 The 
Supreme Court heard of numerous hog producers whose names were not on the list, and 
whose concerns regarding the voters list were ignored by both the county clerks and 
Perkins, Chair of the Farm Products Marketing Board. The court was also told that a 
number o f individuals were assured that, if  they voted “yes”, their names would appear 
on the final voters list. There were also numerous cases of two or more individuals from 
the same farm operation voting in favour of the plan. The strongest indictment against the 
validity o f the plebiscite was the statement that supporters of the plan, active members in 
the Hog Producers’ Associations and the Hog Producers’ Co-operative, were involved in
215 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 116.
216 Testimony in the Supreme Court o f Ontario from Arnold Darroch, Peter McDonald, Charles L. Coultis 
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preparing the voters list. These groups were accused with ensuring that only the names 
of individuals who they knew supported the plan appeared on the list.219
While the Supreme Court considered the case, the Ontario Court of Appeals 
declared in January 1959 that the 1957 Hog Marketing Plan was invalid, as it was not 
simply an amendment of the previous scheme but had been created by new regulations.220 
After considering the evidence, Justice McRuer of the Supreme Court o f Ontario declared 
the July 1958 vote was invalid, which led many in the press to state the hog-marketing 
program was also null and void.221 This was another major setback for the organized hog 
producers, but as the OHPMB had organized under a plan voted upon in 1945, a plan that 
had been found valid by the Supreme Court of Canada, the hog producers were able to 
continue their work. The results of the vote and the court case put Ontario’s 
Conservative government and the Marketing Board at odds. The OHPMB believed that 
the 68 per cent vote had demonstrated farmer support, entitling the Board to the right of 
some form of self-government. Frost’s Conservative government stood its ground that 
the Farm Products Marketing Board should review all o f the actions taken by producer 
boards. Through 1959 and 1960, tensions ran high. The government, especially 
Minister Goodfellow and Everett Biggs, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, felt the methods 
used in selling hogs were not in the long-term interest of orderly marketing. Charlie
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Mclnnis and Biggs toured the province to explain their respective positions.223 The 
editorial page o f The Market Place, the official organ of the OHPA, accused the 
government o f being influenced by the big packers.224 In January 1960, Agriculture 
Minister Goodfellow suggested a new plebiscite be held, in view of the invalidation of 
the 1958 plebiscite. The Conservative government also introduced Bill 86 in the Ontario 
legislature, amending marketing board legislation to give the provincial Farm Products 
Marketing Board more control over the operation of individual boards.225 “In farm 
circles, and more particularly in hog producer circles, Bill 86 immediately became a 
‘dirty word.”’226
The debate in the provincial legislature was fierce. Agriculture Minister 
Goodfellow suggested the Ontario hog producers had “repeatedly broken faith with the 
Ontario farm products marketing board.” Donald C MacDonald, Leader of the NDP, 
argued the government was trying to strip the power of democratically organized and 
operated marketing boards and place these boards under government trusteeship. 
MacDonald stated it was the meat packers who had breached the public trust. The 
packers, MacDonald said, had constantly worked to undermine the marketing schemes 
and had not accepted the work of the hog producers over the fifteen years they had been 
organizing the plans.227 Farquhar Oliver, former leader of the Liberal opposition and a 
member o f the Legislative Assembly originally elected as part o f the United Farmers 
government, stated the government should support the farmers who had voted to create a 
marketing organization. Oliver made it clear that he was not necessarily supporting the
223 Ibid., 120.
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225 Rea, The Prosperous Years, 140.
226 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 122.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
106
cause of Charles Mclnnis but that the Department of Agriculture was unfairly meddling 
in the hog producers’ association, as the government was telling the producers what they 
could or could not do.228 John Wintermeyer, Leader of the Liberal Opposition, stated that 
Bill 86 gave the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Board complete control and denied the 
producer the right to appoint local boards.229
When Bill 86 passed in March 1960, it gave the Ontario Farm Products Marketing 
Board the power to dictate how commodity marketing boards spent their money. The act 
allowed the Farm Products Marketing Board, and through it, the government, to declare 
how farmers’ boards could spend their money, including how much they could spend on 
education and promotional programs. The act allowed the government to prevent 
commodity boards from giving grants to other groups as well as enabling the state to put 
boards under trusteeship at any time. Members of the OHPA viewed this as an attack 
against them, as the OHPMB had supplied substantial monies to the Association for 
educational purposes. Under the authority granted by Bill 86, the Farm Products 
Marketing Act placed strict restrictions on the hog producers’ organizations. Responding 
to concerns of the meat packers regarding the sales methods of the OHPC, the Farm 
Products Marketing Board told the hog producers to develop a method of sale that 
allowed for full competitive bidding.231 Following the passage o f Bill 86, the Ontario 
government announced it was postponing the suggested plebiscite and a new date was 
never set. On 31 October 1960, the Ontario Minister o f Agriculture announced several
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changes in the hog producers’ organization, including changing the method of sales and 
the method of electing members of the OHPMB.232 By March 1961, the Board agreed to 
use a teletype system of sales, allowing open auctions on all the hogs the board sold, 
while also providing a record of bids presented. Previous to this, auctions had taken 
place via telephone calls to the OHPMB office. Many packers felt this allowed the board 
to sell hogs to preferred packers, and not necessarily those that bid the most. This pleased 
the processors, because it eliminated concerns that hog producers were unfairly selecting 
which processors received hogs.
Mclnnis Moves On
The membership of the hog producers’ boards also changed significantly. Under 
the changes introduced by the Farm Products Marketing Board, the practice of electing 
members at large ended and all board members were henceforth elected to represent 
specific zones. This was a direct challenge to the role of prominent individuals in the 
movement, including Charles Mclnnis who had served the hog producers’ organizations 
from the beginning. Since the organization of the Board, Mclnnis served as an elected 
member at large. The elimination of these positions challenged M clnnis’ involvement in 
the movement. At the 1961 Annual meeting of the OHPA, OHPMB and the Co-op, a 
new method of electing representatives was instituted, based on eleven zones in the 
province. Farmers in each of these zones elected committee members, which, in turn, 
elected members to the Marketing Board from their zone. The 1961 election resulted in 
rival slates of candidates nominated for committee positions, with a clear line between
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those who promised to do away with the marketing plan and those who promised to 
support the old Board.235 The Board that resulted from this new system included four 
members o f the old Board, four new members who were known supporters of the 
marketing board system, and three opponents of the marketing plan.236 New leaders were 
elected and, for the first time since their formation, the three boards had different 
directors and leaders. The Farm Products Marketing Board delineated the responsibilities 
of the three organizations. The OHPC was given authority over selling, the OHPA was in 
charge of promotion and public relations, and the OHPMB had authority over licensing 
while also having authority over the other two organizations.237 Bill 86 significantly 
changed the make-up of the OHPMB and the OHPC, as well as similar organizations that 
came later, shifting them from groups controlled by farmers to ones the government 
could oversee and over-ride, if deemed necessary.
Among the largest and most important changes affecting the hog producers’ 
organizations was the departure of Charles Mclnnis. Mclnnis had played a major role in 
the development of the organizations as President of the OHPA and as a board member 
on the OHPMB. Mclnnis’ outspoken nature had aroused significant opposition and when 
he retired from his position in the OHPA, Mclnnis did so feeling his opponents had 
forced him out. Mclnnis explained he left the board with “a feeling of sadness” he could 
not explain. In a letter to Wilfred Bishop, Mclnnis expressed his feelings that the Board 
had fought “a battle against state control,” a battle the Board had lost, and that he 
“experienced the shift from producer control to state control, a situation which will, as the 
years go by, do untold harm to the farmers of this province (Ontario).” He felt that the
235 Ibid., 128.
236 Ibid., 129.
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new plan proposed by the government was doomed to fail, but he also stated he had not
given up hope as there were areas were farmers could still work together.238
Bill 86 presented the end of an era. Up to that point, farmers had been inspired to
work together through fiery rhetoric and appeals to the common good. Working together,
farmers achieved substantial control over their products and were able to significantly
influence the monies they received for their products. The hog producers stood united for
the rights of farmers. While this had aroused serious opposition, Bill 86 did not end the
development o f marketing boards. Nor did Bill 86 end the efforts of farmers to unite and
change the system they faced.
Following the passage of Bill 86, Charlie Mclnnis, long-time leader of the
organized hog producers in Ontario, began to feel that working under the authority of the
government through a local marketing board was a lost cause.239 Mclnnis considered
other ways to maintain producer control and influence prices. He came to support the
establishment of a co-operative meat-packing organization, which would come to be
known as the Farmers’ Allied Meat Enterprises (FAME). Mclnnis later explained his
efforts to “rationalize hog marketing to protect the growers had long been a thorn in the
side of the agricultural establishment.” Mclnnis felt that some members of this
agricultural establishment attempted to “ease him into retirement” especially when they
had made him the guest o f honour at the 1961 Annual meeting o f the OHPA, announced
his retirement, and presenting him with a gift:
.. .as the aroma of the event drifted into the Mclnnis nostrils, the gleam of 
battle entered his eye. He rose to make the expected thank-you speech, but
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instead spelled out in detail and with evangelical fervor [sic] his plans for 
FAME. Then with a grand gesture he presented his ‘retirement’ gifts to the 
new organization ‘to serve the best interests of the Canadian livestock 
producers.240
In his farewell address, Mclnnis declared that an inadequate proportion of consumer 
spending was reaching the farm. Mclnnis also criticized state control o f marketing, in 
place of producer control o f marketing, as introduced by Bill 86.241
Mclnnis and other individuals who had been involved in the OHPA since the 
beginning decided to establish a producer co-operative plant to extend farmer influence 
and provide competition for major processors. Led by Mclnnis, nearly 13,000 Ontario 
farmers invested money in an attempt to create a series of producer-owned processing 
plants. Hog farmers had expressed their support for such a plant over the years, through a 
variety of resolutions passed by county Hog Producer Associations.242 A previous attempt 
to establish a co-operative plant had been undertaken by a group known as the Hamilton
' J A ' i
Co-operative Packers, operating from 1951 to 1953. FAME was not officially 
associated with the OHPMB and while the Hog Producers Association had been the 
sponsoring body in its early development, after 7 April 1961, it was officially a separate 
entity.244 Many of the directors of FAME were previous directors o f the OHPMB, yet 
only Wilfred Bishop served on both boards concurrently.
The organizers o f FAME aimed to create a large enough system of packing plants 
and buy enough livestock, as offered on the open market or by private sales, to raise the
240 ‘Charley Mclnnis Walks a Lonely Road’, Monetary Times, January 1966, 52-53.
241 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 130.
242 Minutes of Eleventh Annual Meeting of Perth County Hog Producers 13 February 1958, Wilfred L 
Bishop Collection, Box 13: Minute Book o f the Perth County Hog Producers Association, 1958-64.
243 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 58-63.
244 Brief sent from R.W. Carbert, Directors of Information from the Canadian Federation o f Agriculture to 
Leonard Harman, 7 April 1961, Leonard Harman/United Co-operatives of Ontario Collection, Archival
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price of livestock to a stable and sufficient level.245 FAME was to compete with the 
growth of large packing corporations, by achieving a vertical integration of production.246 
Mclnnis told farmers the producers could only get 30 per cent o f what the consumers 
paid for the products. He believed the intermediaries, who took 70 per cent of the profits, 
were not all necessary and these were where the producers could achieve profits.247 The 
plan for FAME included building seven packing plants across the province, and nearly 
$2.5 million in shares and debentures were sold for this purpose.248 By early 1964, 
however, FAME was unable to secure enough funds to begin construction on any plants 
and member interest declined. The FAME board felt that a building program had to be 
started.249 In July 1964, FAME began to consider the purchase of a meat processing 
plant in Burlington and on 31 July 1964, the FAME board passed a motion to purchase 
the plant, at a price not to exceed $3 million.250 FAME was not able to obtain the 
necessary funds, however, and despite several attempts to secure bank loans, lost the 
packing plant and the $1,500,000 it had already paid to the previous owner. In December 
1964, Mclnnis resigned as President o f FAME.251
FAME turned to other agricultural organizations, including the OFA and the 
United Co-operatives of Ontario, as well as the provincial hog producers’ organization,
and Special Collections University o f Guelph Library, Farmers Allied Meat Enterprises Co-op Ltd, File 1, 
1960-63,
245 Report o f the Commissioner under the Designation FAME Inquiry in respect o f the affairs o f Farmers’ 
Allied Meat Enterprises, 23.
246 ‘Charles Mclnnis Sees Co-op market power as the key to a more stable farm economy,’ The Market 
P la ce , M ay 1961
247 Letter from Charles Mclnnis to Mrs. Miller, 19 February 1964, Leonard Harman/United Co-operatives 
of Ontario Collection: Farmers Allied Meat Enterprises Co-op Ltd, File 2, 1964-1965.
248 Report o f the Commissioner under the Designation FAME Inquiry in respect o f the affairs o f Farmers’ 
Allied Meat Enterprises, 28.
249 Report from A. Service, Director, to Fourth Annual Meeting of FAME, 25 November 1964, Wilfred L 
Bishop Collection, Box 16: Fame 1964-66.
250 Minutes o f FAME meeting, 31 July 1964, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 16: Fame 1964-66.
251 Minutes o f FAME meeting, 3 December 1964.
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but the co-operative was unable to achieve the financial support necessary to secure the 
purchase of the packing plant. In January, upset members of the co-operative requested a 
provincial government inquiry look into the FAME situation and, at the end of February, 
Premier John Robarts announced that a full investigation would be undertaken. The 
report of the Commissioner, released on 19 August 1965, stated that FAME’S plans had 
been doomed from the beginning. He suggested FAME’S directors did not have the 
business experience needed to run the co-operative packing plants, especially considering 
that the packing plant FAME had purchased was running at a loss for the two years 
before its sale. The report largely blamed Mclnnis and the directors who followed his 
suggestions without question.253 Mclnnis, meanwhile, blamed unknown ‘sources’ for 
opposition to the plan, sources that spread opposition to FAME around the farming 
community.254 Mclnnis also stated he had been unaware that the Burlington packing plant 
was losing money.255 Other members of the FAME board, including Wilfred Bishop, felt 
a conspiracy existed to steal nearly $2 million from farmers. Bishop went so far as to 
contact a private investigator and ask Ontario’s Solicitor General to look into the 
matter.256
The most interesting aspect of FAME’S organizational effort was that the very 
same individuals who attempted to establish the co-operative had previously created a 
system that would prevent FAME from operating as a successful co-operative. Many 
members of the FAME board had previously fought to provide the Ontario Hog
252 ‘Probe o f FAME Set by Robarts,’ Globe and Mail, 3 March 1965.
253 ‘FAME Report Brought Down,’ The Market Place 10 No. 11 November 1965.
254 ‘Charley Mclnnis Walks A Lonely Road,’ 55.
255 Ibid., 61.
256 Letter from Wilfred Bishop to Larry Pennell, Solicitor General, 27 December 1965, Wilfred L Bishop 
Collection, Box 16: Fame 1964-66.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
113
Producers Marketing Board with exclusive selling authority over hogs. Yet, it was this 
authority that prevented FAME, and any co-operative seeking to process and sell the 
products o f its members, from doing so, as all hogs were required to be sold through the 
OHPMB via an open teletype system. The existence of this marketing legislation forced 
co-operatives to turn away from the traditional co-operative practices o f only purchasing
7^7from their members. The marketing legislation, in effect, ended the need and the 
capability o f co-operatives to operate. Some supporters of the FAME ideal stated it was 
marketing boards that would be obsolete. It was suggested, while compulsory marketing 
was useful and unifying and an educative force for farmers, it would not be necessary
7^8  ♦when enough livestock was processed in co-operative plants. In the end, the failure of 
the FAME experiment served two very significant roles. First, Charles Mclnnis retired to
7his son’s farm, from any public role in the agricultural movement. Secondly, with the 
loss of a significant amount of members’ money, Ontario’s farmers were scared away 
from attempts to establish producer co-operatives and relied instead on marketing boards 
to influence the industry.
257 Report o f the FAME Inquiry, 21.
258 An Open Letter to Co-operative Leaders in Ontario from R.S. Staples, 16 December 1960, Leonard 
Harman/ United Co-operatives o f Ontario Collection: Farmers Allied Meat Enterprises Co-op Ltd, File 1, 
1960-63.
259 ‘Charley Mclnnis Walks a Lonely Road,’ 51.
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Conclusion: The Lasting Impact of the Hog Producers
In 1962 and 1963, the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plan received attention 
from other Canadian provinces, including representatives from Alberta which considered 
establishing its own marketing scheme, and the US. 1 After single-desk selling had been 
achieved, the focus of the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board (later renamed the 
Ontario Pork Producers Marketing Board, and later yet, Ontario Pork) shifted to 
promotion of pork in order to increase consumption of, and thus demand for, the product. 
In 1964, hog producers supported the idea o f spending up to four million dollars a year to 
promote pork. In July 1966, the Canadian Swine Council, later named the Canadian Pork 
Council, was formed with representatives from hog producers all across the country.
As the first marketing board to establish single-desk selling, the OHPMB fought 
many battles so other organizations would not have to, and many commentators viewed 
the hog industry as being the most difficult part of Ontario agriculture to bring under 
collective control.4 During the 1960s, other marketing boards were established with 
controls more rigid “than anyone with responsibility in the Hog Organizations had ever 
imagined in their wildest dreams.”5 Legal challenges to direction and selling programs, so 
common from 1955 to 1960, were no longer a concern. The Ontario Hog Producers 
Marketing Board set the pace for other organizations to follow. It was the first marketing 
plan to involve livestock. The next animal plan did not appear until 1965, when the
1 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 148.
2 Ibid., 151.
3 Ibid., 153.
4 Rea, The Prosperous Years, 140.
5 Bishop, Men and Pork Chops, 147.
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Ontario Broiler Chicken Producers’ Marketing Plan and the Ontario Turkey Producers’ 
Marketing Plan were created.6
Following on the success of the hog producers, Ontario’s milk producers 
established their own marketing board. Numerous producer boards representing different 
aspects o f the dairy industry had existed since the 1930s, and meetings had discussed the 
idea throughout the late 1950s and into the 1960s, but the first official meeting of a milk 
marketing board for all raw milk was not held until August 1965.7 Conservative Minister 
of Agriculture Bill Stewart considered calling a vote on the matter, but, perhaps 
remembering the problems that faced the hog producers, decided, if  votes were cast, the 
community of milk producers would be split and the idea of organizing a board would be 
hopelessly delayed. Minister Stewart also felt the election of representatives to the board 
would result in a number of directors being elected who opposed the board, and thus the 
minister appointed the first board.8 The development of the Ontario Milk Board was the 
very opposite of the story of the OHPMB. While the OHPMB had to fight to organize 
itself and struggled to survive against government opposition, the Milk Board was 
created largely at the government’s behest that such a board should exist. While the Milk 
Board was opposed by many milk producers, it retained the support of the government, 
even when it implemented and expanded quota systems, and established a mandatory 
milk pool in 1968.9 Milk producers in Ontario had long considered changing the 
marketing system but no one group or individual took charge, as Mclnnis did for the hog
6 Reaman, A History o f  Agriculture in Ontario, 201-202.
7 Biggs, The Challenge o f  Achievement, 29.
8 Ibid., 38.
9 Ibid., 92-96.
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producers.10 Failing this, the government led the charge to develop the Milk Board. 
Donald C. MacDonald warned the government was taking too strong a role in 
establishing the Milk Board, and the Board was in danger of being controlled by the 
government.11 By 1970, the Milk Board was the sole buyer of all milk marketed in
t
Ontario and the only source for Ontario processors. By 1972, the Milk Marketing Board 
had withstood a challenge from the Supreme Court of Canada and established supply 
management for all forms of milk in Ontario.13
The development o f marketing boards was an important step for Ontario’s 
farmers because it provided them with some influence over the sales of their products.
By 1965, nearly 60 per cent o f the income of Ontario farmers was derived from the sale 
of products covered by some kind of marketing scheme.14 At that time, only producers of 
beef and some vegetables did not have marketing plans, and 75 per cent of Ontario 
producers were organized under a local board. The use and development of marketing 
legislation occurred much faster in Ontario than the rest of Canada.15
Not all producers fully accepted the idea of having control over marketing. In the 
1990s, pork producers in Ontario debated eliminating the single-desk selling mechanism 
and ending Ontario Pork’s legal authority to act as the sole seller o f hogs in the province 
of Ontario. Some producers suggested the single desk aspect o f the marketing board lead 
to missed marketing opportunities for farmers.16 In 1996, the marketing board issued a 
strong recommendation to end single-desk selling. In November 2006, Ontario Pork
10 Ibid., 8.
11 Ontario, Legislature, House o f Commons, Legislature o f Ontario Debates, April 1 1965, 1831.
12 Biggs, The Challenge o f  Achievement, 103.
13 Ibid., 113.
14 Rea, The Prosperous Years 139.
15 Ontario, Legislature, House o f Commons, Legislature o f Ontario Debates, May 27 1965, 3309.
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began a consultation process with Ontario producers to determine their feelings towards 
the board, with debates on the future of the pork producers including all individuals with 
an interest in hog production, including genetic companies.17
In 1957, over 37,000 hog producers voted in the producer plebiscite. This number 
represented less than half of the hog producers in the province. By 2005, according to the 
statistics presented by the Ontario Pork Producers, there were only 3,300 pork producers 
in all of Ontario, marketing 5.48 million hogs.18 The change represented by these 
numbers is astounding. In fifty years, the number of hog producers in Ontario decreased 
by 96 per cent while the number of hogs produced increased. Similar changes can be 
seen across Canada’s agricultural community, with the number o f farmers decreasing 
while production remains at stable levels, or even increases. As the number o f farmers 
decreases, their political influence and importance decreases.
Modern farming is defined by mechanization, relatively low labour input, and 
high yields. Production is nearly uniform across the country, and indeed around the 
world, with fewer than thirty crop varieties providing 95 per cent o f the world’s food 
intake.19 Corporate influence and control have strongly affected farmers as part o f an 
industrialized food system. Many farmers exist within the system and are able to survive. 
Small groups o f farmers challenge the system, however, hoping to lead a revolution 
through a variety of alternatives like the slow food movement, which focuses on local 
and organic crops, or advocates other uses for crops such as producing bio-diesel or 
ethanol, in order to find new markets. Other farmers are struggling to protect the systems
16 Don Stoneman, ‘The Battle is joined on single-desk selling in Ontario,’ Better Pork 7, no. 5 (October 
2006): 6.
17 Ibid., 7
18 Corporate Profile, Ontario Pork Producers’ Marketing Board, 2005.
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established for their protection, including government stabilization, supply-management 
boards, and the monopoly powers of the Canadian Wheat Board.
The farmers who developed alternatives are the latest chapter in the history of 
farmers who challenged the system and struggled to protect their rights and economic 
situation. Through the late nineteenth and all of the twentieth century, Canadian farmers 
worked to achieve a better position for themselves. An important part of this battle 
focused on establishing producer control over prices, or at least providing producers with 
a means to influence the prices they received. Farmers were, and are, numerous and 
diverse whereas the potential buyers are few and centralized. As farms became larger, 
producers required more goods that they could not personally make but had to purchase. 
With this in mind, farmers could not hold off selling their goods.
Agriculture is an important aspect of any society. The development of agriculture 
can affect a great number of things. Myths of agrarian-based settlement provide a 
cultural framework for many societies, and encourage citizens and politicians alike to 
look longingly at ‘simpler’ times when the population was closer to the earth.
Agriculture had a serious impact on immigration patterns, as populations were 
encouraged to move to develop farming, such as the Canadian prairies and the U.S. mid­
west. Agricultural practices can also have a significant impact on eco-systems, as a 
single, managed crop replaces native, natural plants. As animal husbandry expands, it 
can encourage the development and spread of disease. Agriculture was, and remains, an 
important industry to populations around the world, and the control of agricultural 
markets is only one of the issues currently facing farmers. In Canada, marketing boards 
developed as Canadian farmers struggled to maintain their place in society. While the
19 David Hahn, ‘Terra Madre 2006,’ The Union Farmer 13, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 17.
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Ontario hog producers provide a good example of the difficulty involved in developing 
marketing boards, there any many other aspects of Ontario’s agricultural history that 
could be investigated.
Canadian farmers are not strangers to collective action. To meet the difficulties 
facing them, farmers used a variety of methods. They flirted with political power but 
failed to achieve enough political strength to change the system. Farmers came together 
in voluntary organizations and co-operatives to “pool” their products, in the hope that 
controlling the sale o f a greater proportion of the product would give more control to the 
producer. As these pools relied on voluntary adherence, many farmers viewed 
membership as a fair-weather arrangement, using the pools when it would benefit them 
but selling outside o f the pools at other times. The achievement o f marketing legislation 
was a major milestone in the advancement of farmers’ collective action. Operation and 
success would not require voluntary action. Instead, the law required producers to follow 
regulations established by a board developed to represent the producers o f the 
commodity.
Many o f these boards merely established negotiating committees to act in the 
interest o f commodity producers. The work of the Ontario Hog Producers’ organizations, 
however, challenged the upper limits of Ontario’s marketing legislation, by initially 
establishing a negotiating agency but eventually achieving single-desk selling, requiring 
all the hogs produced in Ontario to be sold through the Marketing Board. The level of 
control achieved by the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board met with opposition 
from processors, the provincial government, and some producers and eventually leading 
to a significant change in Ontario’s marketing legislation that gave more control to the
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provincial government and the Department o f Agriculture. Changes to the legislation did
not end attempts by farmers to organize and the control achieved by the hog producers
was limited compared to the power held by later government-created organizations such
as the Ontario Milk Marketing Board. While the Hog Producers Marketing Board plan
allowed the Board to control when and where producers sold their hogs, the plan
established by Ontario’s milk producers would establish a quota system, enabling the
board to determine how much each farmer could produce and market.
Supply management still causes considerable controversy. Some critiques argue
the marketing boards involved in supply management have “economic, constitutional,
and administrative law implications which are totally out of proportion to their relative
obscurity,” even suggesting that, through supply management, marketing boards interfere
00with civil liberties and hold sway over Parliament. Advocates of supply-management 
suggest that only through supply-management have producers been able to gain the upper 
hand in the battle between producers and processors.21
20 Green, ‘Agricultural Marketing Boards in Canada,’ 407.
21 Wilson, Farming the System, 168.
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